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INTRODUCTION
Do corporate boards care about compliance? Surely they
should, because of the potentially catastrophic consequences of
ignoring it. Take the example of the recent compliance failures
at Wells Fargo, the large bank, which pioneered a strategy of
“cross-selling” financial products to its customers.1 This turned
out to be profitable, and the bank sought to maximize its rollout
by setting branch staff powerful financial incentives to maximize
sales of financial products to its customers. 2 Unfortunately,
these incentives triggered widespread fraud on the part of the
bank’s employees, with customers discovering products had been
charged to their names without their consent.3 After the Wells
Fargo scandal broke, regulators identified numerous weaknesses in the firm’s compliance programs that had permitted the
misconduct to go unchecked.4 The bank ultimately paid about
$575 million in fines and settlements and fired over 5,000 employees; the CEO resigned after Congressional hearings.5 In response, the Board commissioned an outside investigation into

1. Consolidated Amended Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint ¶ 1,
In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 4, 2017) (No. 16-05541) [hereinafter Wells Fargo Complaint] (alleging
defendants “defrauded their customers in an attempt to drive up ‘cross-selling,’
i.e., selling complementary Wells Fargo banking products to prospective or existing customers”).
2. Proposed Order to Cease & Desist at 2, In re Wells Fargo & Co., No. 18007-B-HC (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 2018) [hereinafter Wells
Fargo Proposed Order] (“[T]he Firm pursued a business strategy that emphasized sales and growth without ensuring that senior management had established and maintained an adequate risk management framework commensurate with the size and complexity of the Firm, which resulted in weak
compliance practices[.]”).
3. Wells Fargo Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1–2.
4. Wells Fargo Proposed Order, supra note 2, at 2.
5. Chris Arnold, Wells Fargo Fires 5,000 Employees Over Fake Accounts,
NPR (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/09/09/493228759/wells-fargo
-fires-5-000-employees-over-fake-accounts [https://perma.cc/H7X6-BD79];
Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo to Pay States About $575 Million to Settle Customer
Harm Claims, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells
-fargo-to-pay-states-about-575-million-to-settle-customer-harm-claims
-11546016757. The subsequent scrutiny brought other compliance problems to
light. (“The bank has paid out more than $4 billion in settlements and fines
since September 2016, much of it stemming from problems that came to light
following the sales scandal.”).
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how this compliance failure happened on its watch.6 Yet, federal
regulators were deeply unsatisfied with the Board’s response. In
early 2018, the Federal Reserve took the unusual step of restricting the growth of the bank as four Board members departed; the
Fed also sent a letter to the former Lead Director, describing his
“many pervasive and serious compliance and conduct failures.”7
This regulatory intervention and board shakeup was unprecedented, but similarly massive failures involving some of the
largest corporations have been common in recent years—from
Enron and WorldCom to BP, HSBC, General Motors,
Volkswagen, and Wells Fargo—resulting in billions paid to enforcers in the United States and changes in corporate governance.8 Amidst the notoriety attracted by these failures, have sanguine corporate boards taken on a more substantial oversight
role in compliance? Surprisingly little literature exists on the
role of boards in compliance.9 In this Article, we present the first
empirical examination of this question, using data from public
filings and corporate prosecutions. Based on these findings, and
on additional information gathered from compliance charters,
news reports, and our conversations with compliance committee
and independent board members, we suggest why boards continue to remain quite reluctant to supervise compliance more actively.10

6. INDEP. DIRS. OF
TIGATION REPORT (Apr.

BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO., SALES PRACTICES INVES10, 2017), https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/
pdf/about/investor-relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UUQ5-8YMZ].
7. John Heltman, Fed Drops Hammer on Wells Fargo as Four Board Members Ousted, AM. BANKER (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/
news/fed-drops-hammer-on-wells-fargo-as-four-board-members-fired [https://
perma.cc/E5V6-4TZC]; see Wells Fargo Proposed Order, supra note 2.
8. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 292–93 (2014) (detailing the top twenty corporate
fines between 2001 and 2012).
9. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the
New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1134 (2003)
(describing several business models which rely heavily on active monitoring by
the board). For additional examples of board-solicited investigations into compliance breakdowns, see, for example, ANTON B. VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD
OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY (May 29, 2014), https://www
.aieg.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Valukas-report-on-gm-redacted2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2TQ-RG3R]
10. See infra Part III.
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In Part I, we introduce the field of compliance and the role
of boards in supervising compliance. Compliance programs are
internal enforcement programs, whereby firms train, monitor,
and discipline employees with respect to applicable laws and regulations.11 For the past quarter-century, U.S. authorities have
offered explicit incentives for corporations to implement such
programs. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for organizations
provide a discount for convicted firms that have in place an “effective” compliance program.12 A firm’s compliance effort is also
taken into consideration in deciding whether to prosecute the
firm should misconduct emerge.13 Prosecutors say they take into
account the effectiveness of a company’s compliance program—
as well as subsequent remedial compliance measures—when deciding whether to charge a firm criminally, and the Department
of Justice (DOJ) has provided detailed guidance on compliance
in this context.14 A range of regulatory agencies similarly uses
both carrots and sticks to encourage compliance.15 The common

11. See Veronica Root, The Compliance Process, 94 IND. L.J. 203, 205–09
(2019) (illustrating the various responsibilities of compliance programs using
the example of the Twenty-First Century Fox and Fox News sexual harassment
compliance program).
12. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.5–2.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
13. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIV., FRAUD SECTION, EVALUATION
OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2014) [hereinafter EVALUATION OF
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2014], https://www.justice.gov/criminal
-fraud/page/file/937501/download [https://perma.cc/QJA8-SEEF] (last updated
Apr. 2019); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, FRAUD SECTION, EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2017) [hereinafter EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2017] (on file with authors); see
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.000 (2018) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/archives/usam/
archives/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations
#9-28.800 [https://perma.cc/Z42K-JF4T].
14. See supra note 13.
15. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.601–606 (2018) (detailing reporting requirements
for organizational compliance with the Office of Foreign Assets Control); Contractor Business Ethics Compliance Program and Disclosure Requirements, 73
Fed. Reg. 67,064, 67,091–67,092 (Nov. 12, 2008); Incentives for Self-Policing:
Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg.
19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000) (discussing the policies of the Environmental Protection
Agency intended to prevent harm to human health and the environment by
providing for reporting of violations); Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Identifying Cooperation Factors That May Reduce a Litigant’s
Sanctions (Aug. 11, 2004); Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of
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theme is that even if employees engage in misconduct, the firm
will receive more lenient treatment so long as it had put in place
a meaningful compliance program.
Boards are formally responsible for oversight of corporations,16 and directors owe their firms fiduciary duties of loyalty.17
While these duties traditionally did not explicitly include compliance,18 this changed in the mid-1990s, when Chancellor Allen
delivered his well-known opinion in Caremark.19 Reflecting the
growing significance of corporate compliance efforts in prosecution and sentencing, Chancellor Allen stated that boards now
needed to assure themselves that their firm had “information
and reporting systems . . . that are reasonably designed to pro-

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001) (asking, among factors informing SEC discretion, “[d]id the company adopt and ensure enforcement of new and more
effective internal controls and procedures designed to prevent a recurrence of
the misconduct?”); IRS, GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(c)(3) ORGANIZATIONS (2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance_practices.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LM6M-WYCM] (“The organization’s governing body bears the
ultimate responsibility for setting ethical standards and ensuring they permeate the organization and inform its practices.”).
16. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2019) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors . . . .” (emphasis added)).
17. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006); see also Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (“[D]irectors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.”); Polk v.
Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986) (“In performing their duties the directors
owe fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the corporation and its
shareholders.”).
18. Prior Delaware caselaw had suggested that directors were “entitled to
rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs
to put them on suspicion that something is wrong”—that is, a “red flag.” Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
19. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and
Stone: Directors’ Evolving Duty To Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323 (J.
Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) (discussing the evolution of Delaware law relating to
directors’ duty to oversee compliance following Caremark and other leading
cases on the subject); Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A
Twenty-Year Lookback, 90 TEMPLE L. REV. 727 (2018) (reviewing subsequent
developments since Caremark); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good
Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719 (2007) (detailing the history of the Caremark
decision).
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vide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board,
each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning
both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance.”20
Should such a system of oversight give an indication of problems—a so-called “red flag”—then the board is expected to take
steps to investigate and take remedial action.21 However, all aspects of this “oversight duty”—both to ensure some system of
oversight exists, and to take action if it flags a problem—are subject to the business judgment rule.22 This means that liability is
triggered only by a failure so egregious as to call into question
the board’s good faith.23 The rationale is that the board, not the
court, knows best how to pursue the firm’s internal compliance
activities.24
As we have seen, both fiduciary duty case law and guidance
from prosecutors and regulators suggest that the board should
have a continuing role in overseeing compliance activity. DOJ
Guidance goes so far as to suggest that there should be a direct
reporting channel from compliance officers to independent members of the board to avoid possible conflicts created by going
20. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
21. See Graham, 188 A.2d at 130 (“[D]irectors are entitled to rely on the
honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them
on suspicion that something is wrong.”); Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys.
v. Corbat, No. 12151, 2017 WL 6452240, at *7–10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2017); Melbourne Mun. Firefighters’ Pension Tr. Fund v. Jacobs, No. 10872, 2016 WL
4076369, at *8–11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2016); In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative
& Class Action Litig., No. 5430, 2011 WL 2176479, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2011) (“If the fiduciaries of a Delaware corporation do not like an applicable
law . . . until it is changed, they must act in good faith to ensure that the corporation tries to comply with its legal duties.”); cf. Wells Fargo Proposed Order,
supra note 2 (outlining expectations for the board to improve its compliance efforts).
22. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (stating that while the obligation to be
well-apprised of the firm’s compliant operations may be placed upon boards, the
determination of specific means for monitoring are left to the judgment of the
firm).
23. The necessary degree of oversight failure to trigger liability was later
characterized by the Delaware Supreme Court as an “utter[ ] fail[ure] to implement any reporting or information controls.” Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370
(Del. 2006).
24. As Chancellor Allen stated in Caremark: “Obviously the level of detail
that is appropriate for such an information system is a question of business
judgment.” Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
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through the CEO. 25 Little relevant guidance, however, prescribes any particular way in which firms should pursue their
compliance oversight function.
One approach towards formalizing board oversight of compliance is for boards to add compliance to the remit of their audit
committees. Following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, all public
companies are required to have an audit committee, comprised
exclusively of independent directors, whose job it is to manage
the company’s relationship with its auditor and oversee its internal financial controls.26 Given this mandatory oversight function
in relation to internal financial controls, boards may see it as a
natural extension to ask their audit committee also to oversee
the company’s more general compliance with applicable laws.
Yet the range of issues raised by compliance with applicable laws
generally is likely quite different from those arising specifically
in relation to financial reporting, implying that more capacity,
and different expertise, may be required. Companies that draw
this conclusion may establish, separately from the audit committee, a distinct compliance committee tasked with oversight of
compliance matters other than financial reporting.
The Wells Fargo case is a sharp reminder that so-called
“compliance programs” are not always meaningful; nor is the corresponding board “oversight.” Many have asked, in the wake of
large corporate scandals, why responsible officers such as CEOs
and managers did not detect and prevent wrongdoing. 27 Such
questions should also be asked about corporate boards. Compliance with regulations and criminal statutes can dramatically affect the performance and success of a company; the stakes can
be as high as those for product design, marketing, or strategic
planning. Yet little is known about the nature, extent, and efficacy of corporate compliance endeavors, or how boards pursue
their role in overseeing them.
25. See EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019, supra
note 13, at 10 (suggesting that one way prosecutors should measure effective
implementation of compliance programs is whether “those responsible for compliance have . . . direct access to the board of directors”).
26. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 746
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j–1 (2012)).
27. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,
112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 183–87 (2011) (describing, for example, weak management
practices reaching the CEO and Board level at Washington Mutual).
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Firms are not required to report details of their compliance
activities and few, if any, make voluntary disclosures regarding
compliance. 28 At the same time, practitioner surveys consistently report that compliance plays a growing influence in corporate life, including the boardroom.29 This has led some commentators to conclude corporate governance has undergone a
“revolution,” with the board’s oversight role in internal corporate
affairs “overtaken by compliance.”30 Others, however, are more
skeptical, arguing that corporate law fiduciary duties do not sufficiently incentivize boards to engage with compliance.31 Plausibly, common patterns of executive and director compensation
may create incentives to under-invest in long-term compliance
activities. 32 Further, some point to detailed provisions about
compliance in deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) that
firms enter into with the authorities to avoid prosecution. 33
28. Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2075, 2100 (2016).
29. See, e.g., PWC, PWC STATE OF COMPLIANCE STUDY 2016, at 3 (2016),
https://www.pwc.se/sv/pdf-reports/state-of-compliance-study-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/737K-PH4L] (detailing the increasing trend towards board
member involvement in compliance efforts).
30. See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2135, 2146 (2019) (describing “explosive growth of compliance departments” over the past decade); Griffith, supra note 28, at 2077
(“American corporate governance has undergone a quiet revolution. Much of its
basic role . . . has been overtaken by compliance.”).
31. See Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15,
27, 50–51 (2013) (arguing factors such as declining stock price and personal
criminal liability are more influential on corporate actors than the risk of private liability under Caremark); Langevoort, supra note 19, at 739–41 (suggesting board members’ compliance incentives may be at odds with their responsibilities to the organization’s financial well-being in situations where corporate
malfeasance has already occurred); John Armour et al., Taking Compliance Seriously, 37 YALE J. REG. 1, 45–47 (2020); cf. W. Robert Thomas, The Ability and
Responsibility of Corporate Law to Improve Criminal Fines, 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
601, 647–50 (2017) (suggesting a corporate clawback bylaw would better incentivize officers to prioritize compliance efforts).
32. See Armour et al., supra note 31, at 31–38.
33. See Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN
THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT
62, 76–81 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (describing the
dual purposes of DPAs as both detection and sanctioning of wrongs, and intervention in affairs of unconvicted corporations to ensure compliance); Jennifer
Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation through Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 355–58 (2017) (referring to deferred prosecution
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These commonly prescribe enhancements to compliance programs, and sometimes mention board oversight.34 Would it be
necessary for prosecutors to demand that companies do more if
boards were already taking these issues seriously? These conflicting perspectives and the lack of clear evidence make it hard
to discern whether Wells Fargo and its ilk are just “bad apples”
or reflect a more systematic lack of engagement with compliance
by public company boards. This is an insecure foundation for policy.
In Part II, we present our empirical results and explore the
results in light of prior literature. We exploit the fact that firms
are required to report details of their board structure in their
public filings to compile what is to our knowledge the first quantitative evidence on the board’s role in compliance. We explore
the hypotheses developed in Part I using director-level data from
BoardEx and data on federal organizational prosecutions from
the Duke University and University of Virginia Corporate Prosecution Registry.35 We find that, contrary to statistics reported
in practitioner surveys, board-level Compliance Committees are
still quite rare in U.S. public companies. Although the proportion
of firms adopting such committees has risen significantly over
time, less than five percent of U.S. public companies have established a separate Compliance Committee.36 In other words, the

agreements as “pretrial diversion agreements” in their discussion of the role of
prosecutorial tools in influencing corporate compliance); James R. Copeland,
The Shadow Regulatory State: The Rise of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 14
CIV. JUST. REP., May 2012, at 1; Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 854–61 (2007) (describing the use of DPAs as a “spur
for institutional reform”).
34. See Rachel E. Barkow, The New Policing of Business Crime, 37 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 435, 457–60 (2014) (characterizing DPAs as part of a “new policing
framework” of business crime); Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra
note 33, at 886–902 (providing data on the use of deferred prosecution agreements to mandate increases in compliance activity); Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A.
Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate
Governance: Evidence from 1993–2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 61, 82–84, 92–99 (2014)
(discussing the use of deferred prosecution agreements to effectuate changes in
corporate governance and providing data on the growing use of DPAs between
1993 and 2013).
35. Jon Ashley & Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Prosecution Registry,
DUKE U. L. & UVA L. LEGAL DATA LAB, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/
corporate-prosecution-registry/index.html [https://perma.cc/7U29-3EGU].
36. See discussion infra Part II.
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vast bulk of public company boards do not have a stand-alone
compliance oversight function.
This finding appears starkly at odds with the practitioner
literature asserting a compliance “revolution.” This is unsettling; but how concerned should we be? Does this mean that
boards are not taking compliance seriously? An immediate issue
is whether establishing a dedicated compliance committee (what
we measure) actually makes a difference—as opposed to adding
compliance to the audit committee’s to-do list—or is simply a cosmetic exercise. To shed light on this, we review compliance committee (CC) and audit committee (AC) charters. These suggest
material differences: CCs are expected to engage in much more
focused oversight of compliance policies and personnel than typical ACs. Moreover, interviews with practitioners suggest board
members view setting up a CC as a significant matter.37 Boards
work under tight time constraints, and so there is a real opportunity cost to adding a CC: time used in staffing this committee
must be foregone elsewhere. Establishing a new committee, it
seems, is not a trivial matter.
In light of this, it is important to understand why CCs are
so rare. We use our data to explore why boards (do not) establish
compliance committees. We present four main findings. First,
companies that get prosecuted are much more likely to establish
CCs. Yet this is not because prosecutors tell them to. In a comprehensive dataset of 374 DPAs and plea bargains entered into
by public companies from 2001 onwards,38 only five agreements
(less than two percent) actually stipulate the creation of some
kind of board compliance committee. Rather, the link appears
indirect. Prosecutors frequently demand enhancements to a
firm’s compliance activities as part of these settlements; this creates a sharp increase in need for compliance oversight, which
boards rationally meet by establishing committees.
Second, we find only weak links between factors that might
make a firm’s exposure to potential prosecution seem more
likely—such as being in a heavily regulated sector, or a high rate
of prior prosecution in their industry. This suggests that even
when compliance might be very important to a particular type of

37. This is based on our confidential interviews with compliance professionals at S&P 500 companies at the beginning of the project.
38. Ashley & Garrett, supra note 35.
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firm, firms are not taking it sufficiently seriously to justify establishment of a dedicated committee. These results suggest
that boards take compliance more seriously after their firm got
caught. Does this imply a troublingly low background level of
board compliance oversight? Our other results give further cause
for concern.
Third, we find that outside experience of board compliance
oversight makes a difference. Companies with a board member
who also sits on the board of a firm that already has a compliance
committee are much more likely to establish one themselves.
This finding suggests that experience matters, consistent with
the general literature of diffusion of innovations. Moreover, it
suggests that these directors’ experience of board compliance is
generally positive, as it increases the likelihood of adoption by
other boards on which they serve. Why, then, are compliance
committees not more widely adopted?
Fourth, we find that firms with compliance committees tend
to be larger and find suggestive evidence that they have bigger
boards. This reinforces the idea that compliance oversight entails real costs for the firms: bigger firms have more capacity for
compliance expenditures; bigger boards can more easily manage
the use of board resources.39 This may mean that boards often
lack the capacity to do compliance oversight other than as an AC
addendum.
Taken together, these results are at once intriguing and
troubling. While our data do not permit any causal interpretation of the findings, they are consistent with theoretical claims
that compliance is more often overlooked, rather than overseen,
by boards. Moreover, they raise a question within corporate governance about optimal board size. Small boards may be best from
the own-firm shareholder point of view but not from the social or
diversified shareholder point of view, when compliance is taken
into account.40 A small board lacks resources for sufficient compliance oversight, and it also creates a baseline in which adoption of a CC signals that the board believes the firm has an
39. We also make a complementary finding that firms with dedicated compliance committees tend to have smaller audit committees. For these firms, the
audit committee has less capacity, and so is less able to accommodate having
compliance added to its list of tasks.
40. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,
88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 293–94 (1980) (providing agency theory for adoption of
small boards, as well as independent directors).
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above-average compliance problem, which may negatively affect
stock price. The desire to avoid giving such a signal could become
a reason for a board not to establish a CC, even when such a
committee would be warranted.
In Part III, we consider ways in which board compliance
might be facilitated or encouraged: reconsidering norms about
board size and independence, enhancing accountability of directors to regulators, and tightening state law fiduciary duties regarding oversight. We emphasize that our results are just a first
step—albeit an important one—and our conclusions are correspondingly tentative. We hope others will engage with the puzzles they raise, and that the nature and success of board compliance will attract the attention that its importance to policy
deserves.
In summary, in Part I, we introduce our research questions.
We review the rationale for compliance programs, and more specifically, the board’s oversight role. In Part II, we present our
empirical results and seek to interpret them in light of prior literature. Part III concludes with a discussion of the implications
of these findings for corporate governance, enforcement, and for
policy.
I. BOARDS AND CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
In this Part, we describe the rise in compliance-focused activity in U.S. corporations, and why, as a result, we and others
would have assumed that a fairly large proportion of public companies would have embraced board-level compliance oversight
through a bespoke committee. We first describe what compliance
programs are and their rationales. We describe the incentives
offered by a range of regulators to enhance the compliance function, including through definitions of “effective compliance.” 41
Second, we describe data from the Duke and University of Virginia Corporate Prosecution Registry, concerning criminal prosecutions of corporations, which often seek to bolster compliance,
but which have only in rare occasions required a board-level
compliance committee. Third, we describe the relationship between the board and compliance, including its fiduciary relationship, and more specifically, through the creation of compliance
committees.
41. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing effective compliance programs).
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A. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THEIR RATIONALES
Corporations are structured to give managers incentives to
generate returns for their investors. In areas where corporate
activities may create negative externalities, regulatory obligations—with civil or criminal penalties—are commonly imposed
on firms to ensure that investors’ returns are aligned with social
welfare. For example, environmental obligations seek to ensure
that the costs of industrial pollution are internalized by polluters
and not shed onto society at large.42 Similarly, workplace and
product safety regulations set minimum standards for firms
with respect to harms to which their work environment or products may expose workers or consumers.43 And laws prohibiting
bribery and corruption, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977 (FCPA), seek to prevent firms from undermining the
functioning of public institutions.44
For regulation to succeed in making companies internalize
the social costs of their activities, however, there must be enforcement.45 Where the probability of enforcement is low, it is
necessary to introduce a very high penalty so as to set the expected cost of non-compliance equal to the social costs of the proscribed conduct. In the context of corporate misconduct, high
penalties are not uncommon. For example, BP paid $62 billion
in fines and clean-up costs after its Deepwater Horizon oil spill.46
Wells Fargo has also been subjected to an order by the Federal
Reserve freezing its growth until compliance failures are remedied, and the company has paid more than $575 million in fines
and settlements to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Securities and

42. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 7401 (2012).
43. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (2012) (“[A]uthorizing the Secretary of
Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and health standards applicable to
businesses affecting interstate commerce.”).
44. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012).
45. Where the firm’s actions harm those who contract with it—customers,
investors, employees, and so forth—then violations of rules will attract market
sanctions in the form of harm to its reputation. The problem of enforcement is
therefore most acute as respects harms caused by the firm’s actions to persons
with whom it does not contract.
46. Ed Crooks, BP Draws Line Under Gulf Spill Costs, FIN. TIMES (July 14,
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/ff2d8bcc-49e9-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab
[https://perma.cc/J9WX-KZYF].
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Exchange Commission, the DOJ, and the States.47 Moreover, if
a firm depends on a regulatory license, then penalties that remove this license can effectively force it out of business.
However, imposing very high corporate penalties has real ex
post costs: jobs may be lost, and firms forced into bankruptcy.48
Enforcers do not relish the prospect of destroying a company,
particularly the collateral consequences of doing so, where many
employees shared no role in wrongdoing and investors suffer financial losses. 49 It is against this background that corporate
compliance programs emerged. The basic idea is that because
firms have better information about their employees’ character
and behavior than does a regulator, firms can monitor misbehavior in a cheaper way than can public authorities, and it is consequently efficient to delegate.
“Compliance” is the name given to institutions established
internally by firms to carry out such delegated enforcement.
Such institutions can reduce the incidence of misconduct and the
need for socially wasteful corporate penalties. 50 However, installing a compliance program may itself have an ambiguous effect on a firm’s expected penalties. While it will likely lower the
incidence of misconduct, it will also likely increase the rate of
detection of any misconduct that does occur.51 If the effect on expected liabilities is ambiguous, it may be hard for managers to
justify expenditure on compliance programs.52
1. Regulating Compliance
To generate additional incentives to adopt compliance programs, firms are offered explicit discounts to any penalties that

47. Wells Fargo Proposed Order, supra note 2; Glazer, supra note 5.
48. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 8, at 42 (describing the perception that
federal prosecutors were responsible for destroying Arthur Andersen).
49. See id. at 252 (describing remarks by then Attorney General Eric
Holder stating that a prosecution of a financial firm could have negative effects
on the United States and world economy).
50. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUDS. 833, 846 (1994) (indicating increased corporate enforcement would reduce corporate crimes).
51. See id. at 836 (concluding that increasing enforcement expenditures
would increase the probability of detection).
52. See id. (discussing conflicting incentives created under enforcement expenditures).
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might be imposed for misconduct, if they had previously implemented an effective compliance program.53 These incentives are
delivered generally in the form of a discount to sentencing under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,54 a factor to be taken into
consideration in deciding whether to prosecute a corporation,55
and guidance for various government agencies assessing
whether to exclude a convicted firm from procurement opportunities.56
There are also specific requirements associated with compliance and internal controls for a range of sector and activity-specific regulatory obligations. These include anti-money laundering, insider trading and structural separation checks for
financial institutions,57 checks regarding the making of corrupt
payments for all firms,58 internal controls over the production of
financial information for publicly-traded firms, 59 and a set of

53. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 12, § 8C2.5(f)
(subtracting culpability score if the organization had an effective compliance
program). This was introduced generally in 1991, with the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, and earlier in certain regulatory settings.
54. Id.
55. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13 (discussing factors prosecutors should consider when evaluating compliance programs); EVALUATION OF
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019, supra note 13 (same); EVALUATION
OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2017, supra note 13 (same).
56. See FAR 9.406-1(a), .407-1(a)(2) (2018) (listing factors the official should
consider). The lowering of sanctions fits with the general theory of optimal enforcement: since the firm’s own “compliance” activities increase the likelihood
of detection, the sanction for non-compliance should be reduced to avoid overdeterrence and then, in the next period, a hollowing out of the firm’s compliance
efforts.
57. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012)
(regulating safeguards against insider trading by personnel); Foreign Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2012) (regulating anti-money laundering
programs); 12 C.F.R. § 21.21 (2019) (regulating procedures for monitoring compliance); 12 C.F.R. § 44.20(a), (c) (2019) (regulating requirements and enhanced
requirements for bank compliance programs); 12 C.F.R. § 44 app. B (2019) (regulating enhanced minimum standards for compliance programs).
58. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to -3
(2012) (regulating prohibited foreign trade practices).
59. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 789
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012)) (regulating management assessment of internal controls); Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8,238, 34-47,986 (effective Aug. 14, 2003), https://
www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm [https://perma.cc/JU8C-AUJ2] (same).
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model compliance program guidelines for clinical laboratories.60
Thus, sometimes compliance is required by statutes and regulations. However, we are unaware of cases where the mandated
features of a compliance program include, specifically, the adoption of a board-level compliance committee.
2. Effective Compliance Programs
An effective compliance program, in theory, would be one
that minimizes the sum of the costs of misconduct and the costs
of avoiding and detecting such misconduct.61 In practice, companies can and are encouraged to use a variety of techniques to
evaluate the effectiveness of compliance efforts, ranging from internal audits and data analytics, to employee surveys and external assessments. There is little consensus as to how compliance
should be achieved.62
In some industry surveys, large numbers of companies, in a
Lake Wobegon fashion, view their compliance as “well above average relative to . . . their peers.” 63 Yet despite much exhortation, especially from professional consultants who offer to assist
in designing compliance programs, relatively little is known
about what these compliance programs actually entail and how
their quality should be assessed.64 When industry participants
speak of “effective compliance programs,” they may refer to programs that meet the expectations of the authorities. Although
60. See Publication of the OIG Model Compliance Plan for Clinical Laboratories, 62 Fed. Reg. 9435 (1997).
61. Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 247 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018) (exploring the economic meaning of effective compliance programs).
62. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 933, 933 (2017) (introducing different opinions); Tom R. Tyler, Reducing
Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 267, 291 (2014)
(calling for “an attempt to develop empirically based policies and practices
through a neutral and independent review of what works”).
63. See, e.g., PWC, 2018 STATE OF COMPLIANCE STUDY 7, https://www.pwc
.com/sk/en/assets/PDFs/2018-state-of-compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MZJ
-ZPZV] (reporting that 85% of respondent corporations rated their compliance
as well above average relative to their peers).
64. See Langevoort, supra note 62, at 933 (questioning about compliance
programs). A study of federal DPAs from 2001 through 2012 found that less
than a quarter of them (22% or 55 of 255 agreements) actually required the
company to assess how effectively its compliance program was functioning. See
GARRETT, supra note 8, at 75 (presenting the study result).
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meeting these requirements is deemed by the authorities to be
“effective,” it does not necessarily follow that they are actually
effective in the sense of minimizing the sum of the costs of misconduct and the costs of avoiding and detecting such misconduct.65
In light of these difficulties, and the fact that firms’ compliance activity is primarily incentivized by the prospect of (waiving) regulatory sanctions, we focus here on the structure of effective compliance programs as envisaged by official guidance.
While the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines contain a detailed set of requirements for a compliance program to count for
sentencing credit, they have actually seen little direct application in recent years. For example, in the fiscal years 2009
through 2012, the U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that no
companies received sentencing credit for having an effective
compliance program.66 Rather, it seems that the primary channel through which compliance delivers a discount to firms has
shifted to prosecutors rewarding effective compliance with leniency through the use of DPAs.67 When a DPA is entered into, the
firm is not formally prosecuted and is never sentenced under the
Guidelines.68
How, then, do compliance programs get taken into account
in the prosecution decision? Public statements about compliance
65. For critiques of the current approach, see, for example, Todd Haugh,
The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215 (2017) (criticizing approaching compliance through a criminal law lens); Miriam Hechler
Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009) (proposing a
new regime to change the current model); and compare with Daniel C. Richman,
Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 277 (2014) (indicating
that the practice of deferred prosecution agreements is only a few decades old
and so it may be too soon to evaluate the long-term impact).
66. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, TABLE 54: ORGANIZATIONS
SENTENCED UNDER CHAPTER EIGHT: CULPABILITY FACTORS (2009–2012),
https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook/archive [https://perma.cc/VR2F
-4N23].
67. The rise of DPAs as the preferred technique for prosecutors dealing
with large public corporate defendants in the United States has been well-documented. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 8, at 82 (presenting the chart showing
dealings under DPAs).
68. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 13, § 9-28.200 (“In certain
instances, it may be appropriate to resolve a corporate criminal case by means
other than indictment . . . . DPAs], for example, occupy an important middle
ground between declining prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a corporation.”).

2020]

BOARD COMPLIANCE

1209

from the DOJ had in the past been quite vague. Take this statement:
The Department has no formulaic requirements regarding corporate
compliance programs. The fundamental questions any prosecutor
should ask are: Is the corporation’s compliance program well designed?
Is the program being applied earnestly and in good faith? Does the corporation’s compliance program work?69

The DOJ guidelines then state that prosecutors should try to assess whether the program is just a “paper program,” and should
consider “whether the corporation has provided for a staff sufficient to audit, document, analyze, and utilize the results of the
corporation’s compliance efforts.”70
Further information about what “effective” compliance
means may potentially be found in the terms of individual DPAs
negotiated with firms, which are typically made public. Over
time, the contours of compliance initiatives disclosed in DPAs
can become an additional source—beyond sentencing guidelines,
statutes, and regulations—of incentives to involve the board in
compliance, revealing at a granular level what prosecutors consider important. Federal prosecutors have over the past fifteen
years taken the lead in seeking compliance changes in target
firms; the DOJ adopted some of the first compliance-focused enforcement guidelines; prosecutors pushed for adoption of corporate monitors to oversee compliance, and have often stated that
a central goal of a corporate prosecution is not just to punish corporate crime but also to rehabilitate firms.
Towards the end of the Obama Administration, the DOJ
hired a Compliance Counsel Expert, who issued guidance to add
more rigor to the scrutiny of corporate compliance. While that
Expert left early in the Trump Administration, the guidance remains in effect, albeit with some statements from the DOJ that
compliance in the form of independent monitor supervision
should be used more selectively. 71 The DOJ’s Criminal Fraud

69. Id. § 9-28.800.
70. Id.
71. Assistant Attorney General Brian A. Benczkowski, Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at N.Y.U. School of Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement Conference on Achieving Effective Compliance (Oct. 12, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-brian-benczkowski
-delivers-remarks-nyu-school-law-program [https://perma.cc/5BZJ-CXV5].
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Section published this guidance in 2017,72 with an updated version in April 2019,73 titled “Evaluation of Corporate Compliance
Programs.” The guidance contains a list of “common questions”
and “sample topics” but not any definitive guide, emphasizing
prosecutors must make an “individualized determination” in
each case.74
3. The Compliance Function Within a Firm
Traditionally, compliance functions were supervised by a
company’s General Counsel, but today, many firms designate at
least some types of ethical and legal compliance as separate from
the General Counsel. 75 There is no consensus amongst scholars—nor in industry—on the merits of separating the compliance function(s) from those centered in the General Counsel’s office.76 One argument for an independent compliance function is
that locating compliance outside of management, apart from the
CEO and General Counsel, and reporting to the organization’s
board, can assure an independent and outside perspective.77 Another is that instilling an effective culture of compliance may necessitate a focus that is not strictly legalistic but rather that
seeks to foster ethical behavior in employees.78 In smaller and
non-public companies, resource constraints may force both roles
to be located in the same office and person. In large and public

72. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2017, supra note
13.
73. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019, supra note
13.
74. Id. at 1–2.
75. See, e.g., Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why
Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 101
(2014) (indicating that a compliance professional is not necessarily a legal professional).
76. See Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 469
(2008) (raising questions “about the role of in-house counsel in implementing
and overseeing compliance mechanisms inside the corporation”).
77. Cf. id. at 471 (indicating that in-house lawyers had compromised their
independence by moving inside).
78. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HODGES & RUTH STEINHOLTZ, ETHICAL BUSINESS PRACTICE AND REGULATION: A BEHAVIOURAL AND VALUES-BASED APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 214–36 (2017) (proposing an ethical approach to compliance).
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companies, though, there is a debate about what structure is
preferable.79
Obviously, in whichever department or reporting line it is
located, the compliance function should be adequately resourced—in this respect, the size of the firm and the nature of
the risks assessed in relation to compliance will be determinative.80 The “resourcing” of compliance should be understood to
include not only the direct costs of employing compliance staff
and training employees regarding compliance, but also the indirect costs of integrating the program into the firm’s business
structure. Done properly, this entails careful assessment of the
incentives created by aspects of the firm’s business model, especially performance targets set for employees.81 Managers seeking to improve performance are often drawn to implementing
performance targets for employees that focus on metrics like
sales, costs, or task completion, because these metrics are readily measurable and have an obvious link to the firm’s performance. However, the pursuit of such metrics to the exclusion of
other considerations has potential to trigger failures in other
harder-to-measure and/or less immediately financially relevant
aspects of performance, such as safety measures or compliance
with law.82 While most employees have natural instincts to be
79. See Michael W. Peregrine, Seeking Clarity at the Crossroads of Legal
and Compliance, CORP. COUNS. (Sept. 18, 2014), https://s3-us-east-2
.amazonaws.com/mwe.media/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/05161327/cc091814
.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9TH-E5YT] (discussing the debate). Compare DeStefano, supra note 75, at 155 (“Departmentalizing compliance from legal so as to
remove general counsel oversight of compliance may not necessarily be in the
public’s best interest.”), with Rostain, supra note 76, at 490 (suggesting “the
general counsel may be well positioned to play a significant gatekeeping role in
their companies”).
80. The experience and qualifications of the Chief Compliance Officer
(CCO) may expect to be scrutinized. An ex post review may scrutinize whether
the compliance department ever asked for additional resources and the responses received from management.
81. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019, supra 13, at
13 (“Has the company considered the implications of its incentives and rewards
on compliance? How does the company incentivize compliance and ethical behavior? Have there been specific examples of actions taken (e.g., promotions or
awards denied) as a result of compliance and ethics considerations? Who determines the compensation, including bonuses, as well as discipline and promotion
of compliance personnel?”).
82. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687, 702–
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concerned with these issues, internal ethical or safety concerns
can be crowded out by sufficiently strong financial incentives.83
Taking full account of the compliance implications of these variables may necessitate significant modifications, dulling the performance impact of the incentive schemes. As a consequence, effective compliance can involve substantial indirect costs, at least
in the short run.
In Part I.A, we have seen that firms are given incentives by
regulators and prosecutors to establish internal compliance programs. Prosecutors give guidance on what they look for in an
“effective” compliance program. Fully implementing this may be
costly for firms. Although firms extol the virtues of their compliance programs, relatively little is known about their actual success in reducing the incidence of misconduct.
B. BOARD OVERSIGHT OF COMPLIANCE
Contemporaneously with the growth of compliance, it has
become clear that corporate boards are expected to engage in
oversight of these programs. These expectations have two distinct sources. First, the prosecution and sentencing guidelines
discussed in Part I.A, insofar as they pertain specifically to the
role of the board, which we review in Part I.B.1. Second, developments in directors’ corporate law fiduciary duties, which we
review in Part I.B.2. We then discuss in Part I.B.3 how board
oversight of compliance may entail mediating conflict between
senior executives and the firms’ compliance function.
1. Expectations of the Board from Prosecutors
As described in Part I.A.2, leniency in prosecution and sentencing decisions has been a primary impetus for corporate compliance programs. The relevant guidance sets expectations specifically about the role of the board in overseeing compliance
programs. Consider first the organizational sentencing guidelines, which inform prosecution decision-making, in addition to
judicial sentencing. These were amended in 2010 to highlight

04 (1997) (noting the significance of employee compensation and promotion policies for efficacy of compliance programs).
83. See Sverre Grepperud & Pal Andreas Pedersen, Crowding Effects and
Work Ethics, 20 LABOUR 125 (2006) (analyzing effects of monetary rewards on
intrinsic motivation).
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board responsibility.84 Section 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) now requires the
board to “be knowledgeable about the content and operation of
the compliance and ethics program and . . . exercise reasonable
oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness
of the compliance and ethics program.”85
The Guidelines go on to state that there should be a direct
reporting obligation from the Compliance Officer to the board or
a board committee.86 Corporations may receive mitigation if persons with operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program “have direct reporting obligations to the governing
authority or an appropriate subgroup thereof (e.g., an audit committee of the board of directors)” and that program detected and
reported the misconduct.87 The compliance personnel “shall be
given adequate resources, appropriate authority, and direct access to the governing authority or an appropriate subgroup of the
governing authority.”88 Thus, the Guidelines reward board involvement in compliance.
Turning to guidance from prosecutors, the DOJ’s Evaluation
of Corporate Compliance Programs, in the section titled “Oversight,” emphasizes the role of the board.89 It asks: “What compliance expertise has been available on the board of directors?”90 It
then asks: “Have the board of directors and/or external auditors
held executive or private sessions with the compliance and control functions? What types of information have the board of directors and senior management examined in their exercise of

84. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 12, ch. 8.
85. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A). Although the Guidelines refer specifically to a “governing authority,” this is taken to mean the board, if the company has one. Id.
§ 8B2.1 cmt. 1 (“‘Governing authority’ means the [sic] (A) the Board of Directors;
or (B) if the organization does not have a Board of Directors, the highest-level
governing body of the organization.”).
86. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (“Specific individual(s) within the organization shall
be delegated day-to-day operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics
program. Individual(s) with operational responsibility shall report periodically
to high-level personnel and, as appropriate, to the governing authority, or an
appropriate subgroup of the governing authority, on the effectiveness of the
compliance and ethics program.”).
87. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(3)(C)(i)–(iii).
88. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C).
89. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2017, supra note
13.
90. Id.
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oversight in the area in which the misconduct occurred?”91 The
DOJ’s Evaluation document then goes on to ask, in the section
headed “Autonomy”: “Have the compliance and relevant control
functions had direct reporting lines to anyone on the board of
directors? How often do they meet with the board of directors?
Are members of the senior management present for these meetings?”92
2. Compliance and Directors’ Fiduciary Duties
As a matter of state organizational law, directors have a fiduciary duty to engage in some level of compliance oversight.93
The narrowest conception is a duty to act when it comes to directors’ attention that there is, or may be, misconduct taking place;
such actual knowledge then triggers a duty to investigate and
take appropriate consequent steps. 94 The necessary investigation and subsequent action demanded will be a function of the
extent of the evidence of the misconduct available to the directors and the seriousness of the consequences of potential misconduct.95 Notice, though, that the extent of this ex post duty depends crucially on the quality of the information coming to the
board.96 To what extent does the board have a positive duty to
ensure an upward flow of information regarding compliance?
Since the well-known 1996 Delaware Chancery Court opinion in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,97

91. Id.
92. Id. at 3.
93. See, e.g., Reiter v. Fairbank, C.A. No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823, at
*1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016).
94. See In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d
1074, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del.
2006)); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); Okla.
Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, C.A. No. 12151-VCG, 2017 WL
6452240, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2017); Melbourne Mun. Firefighters’ Pension
Tr. Fund v. Jacobs, C.A. No. 10872-VCMR, 2016 WL 4076369, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 1, 2016) (citing Stone, 911 A.2d at 370); In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative
& Class Action Litig., C.A. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *22 n.157 (Del.
Ch. May 31, 2011) (citing Stone, 911 A.2d at 370).
95. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 12,
§ 8C2.5(f).
96. See cases cited supra note 94.
97. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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directors have also been expected to ensure some system of oversight is implemented in the first place. As Chancellor Allen explained:
[I]t would, in my opinion, be a mistake to conclude that . . . corporate
boards may satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation, without assuring themselves that information and
reporting systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the board itself timely,
accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board,
each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the
corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance.98

However, the duty is merely one of good faith, failure to meet
which would require “a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt
to assure a reasonable information and reporting system
exi[s]ts[.]”99 Or, as it was subsequently put by the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. Ritter: “(a) the directors utterly failed to
implement any reporting or information system or controls; or
(b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously
failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their
attention.”100
Thus, the Delaware caselaw is as unspecific and general as
much of the guidance that comes through both DOJ guidelines
and enforcement. Compliance matters and complete failures of
the board to oversee compliance will have grave consequences.
But what consists in effective or sound compliance—or its oversight—is left unstated.101
98. Id. at 970.
99. Id. at 971.
100. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
101. See Armour et al., supra note 31, at 45–47. Recent cases suggest the
emergence of an affirmative duty of board-level compliance oversight where the
firm is subject to a comprehensive regulatory scheme applicable to an essential
feature of its business, for example, Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del.
2019) (concerning food safety regulation for core product), or where the firm is
subject to a specific compliance decree entered into to resolve a prior regulatory
failure, for example, In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. 220 Litig., Consolidated C.A. No.
2018-0661-JRS, 2019 WL 2320842, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019) (declaring that
where a board fails to oversee compliance with a consent decree, “Delaware
courts traditionally have viewed stockholder allegations that a board failed to
oversee the company’s obligation to comply with positive law, or positive regulatory mandates, more favorably in the Caremark paradigm than allegations
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3. Boards’ Role in Mediating Conflict over Compliance
Apart from the priorities placed on compliance by enforcers,
boards themselves have conflicting incentives regarding the
compliance function. In particular, conflicts may emerge between immediate financial considerations prioritized by managers and the objectives of effective compliance. Executive compensation is typically tightly linked to a firm’s stock price so as to
encourage focus on shareholder value.102 This can create conflict
over the establishment of a compliance program, and over how
such a program is run.103 Assuming that the penalties for regulatory violations are set so as to give shareholders appropriate
incentives to internalize social costs, such conflict is a corporate
governance problem. That is, managers may fail to take actions
to minimize expected penalties that would be in the interests of
shareholders.
To see how such costs could emerge, note that although establishing a compliance program can reduce a firm’s expected
penalties, doing so sends a compound signal to investors. It signals both: (1) that the firm is taking compliance seriously (a good
thing for investors); and (2) that the firm considers it is appropriate to take compliance seriously. This second component may
have a negative impact on the stock price. 104 All other things
equal, whether the firm thinks it is appropriate to invest in compliance is a function of the likelihood of enforcement.105 Consequently, a firm that discloses a compliance program signals that
it anticipates it has a relatively high chance of attracting enforcement.106 Although the fact that the firm is taking compliance seriously is good news for investors, this can only ever reduce, but not eliminate, expected penalties:107 the net effect of

that a board failed to oversee the company’s efforts generally to avoid business
risk”).
102. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan, CEO Pay and Corporate Governance in the
U.S.: Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges, 25 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 15 (2013).
103. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 33, at 354–57; Armour et al., supra note
31, at 20–31.
104. See Armour et al., supra note 31, at 4.
105. See, e.g., id. at 13–14.
106. Id. at 29–30.
107. The presence of an effective compliance program can reduce a firm’s
penalty by between sixty to eighty percent. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 12, §§ 8C2.5(f), 8C2.6.
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the signal is therefore likely to be negative. Consequently, managers seeking to maximize the stock price likely prefer not to disclose details of a firm’s compliance activities.108 Consistent with
this proposition, firms do not voluntarily disclose any meaningful information about their compliance activity.109
Conflicts are also likely to emerge in the running of a compliance program. If misconduct is detected, a manager believing
there to be a low probability of enforcement may seek to cover up
the misconduct, so as to avoid an adverse impact on the stock
price. 110 Chief Compliance Officers may find themselves sidelined or even fired by CEOs anxious to avoid this sort of revelation. The fear of such treatment will undermine the efficacy of a
compliance program, and consequently the DOJ’s guidance now
provides that the compliance team should enjoy autonomy from
management, facilitated by a direct reporting channel to the
board.111
The board is increasingly viewed as a forum for resolving
such conflicts.112 The DOJ’s memorandum and other guidance
regarding effective compliance provide that responsibility for internal oversight and monitoring of compliance programs should
lie with the board of directors, usually through a committee of
independent directors—either the audit committee or, where established, a separate compliance committee.113 Boards are ex-

108. See id.; Armour et al., supra note 31, at 5.
109. Griffith, supra note 28, at 2138–39. Our own searches of EDGAR filings
turned up no meaningful information about corporate compliance activity.
110. See Armour et al., supra note 31, at 12 n.50.
111. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019, supra note
13, at 11 (“Do the compliance and relevant control functions have direct reporting lines to anyone on the board of directors and/or audit committee? How often
do they meet with directors?”).
112. See, e.g., Martin Lipton et al., Risk Management and the Board of Directors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/20/risk-management-and-the-board
-of-directors-5/ [https://perma.cc/DS5R-CGUR] (describing the board’s oversight
role).
113. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2017, supra note
13, at 2 (“Oversight–What compliance expertise has been available on the board
of directors? Have the board of directors and/or external auditors held executive
or private sessions with the compliance and control functions? What types of
information have the board of directors and senior management examined in
their exercise of oversight in the area in which the misconduct occurred?”); see
also ETHICS & COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF HIGH-
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pected to understand the goals and operation of their firm’s compliance function, which should be supported by regular reporting
and a clear flow of information.114 Moreover, it is increasingly
thought that a direct channel of reporting from compliance to the
board is a means of fostering not only autonomy within the compliance program but also an open upward transmission of information.115 The DOJ guidance cites to such communication as relevant both to oversight and autonomy.116
The board’s role in managing conflict between the firm’s
compliance function and other senior executives lies outside traditional accounts of corporate governance.117 Most accounts see
the board’s role as being to monitor the executives’ management
of the company in the interests of shareholders, with a view to
reducing agency costs.118 To this end, much emphasis is placed
on the need for directors to be independent of executives, to buttress against conflicts of interest.119 In overseeing compliance,
the boards are monitoring the executives’ resourcing and implementation of the firm’s compliance program and the management of conflicts between compliance needs and the pursuit of
strategic goals.120 Because of the financial implications of compliance, resolving such conflicts in accordance with regulatory
guidance regarding best practice is ultimately in the interests of
shareholders.
C. BOARD STRUCTURE AND COMPLIANCE OVERSIGHT
Neither the DOJ guidance nor corporate law specifies the
process through which the board should exercise compliance
QUALITY ETHICS & COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS: REPORT OF ECI’S BLUE RIBBON
PANEL 19 (2016) (“The E[thics &] C[ompliance] structure ensures independence
and regular access to the board and/or the audit committee.”).
114. See, e.g., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2017, supra note 13, at 2–3.
115. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019, supra note
13, at 10.
116. Id. at 4 (“Another hallmark of a well-designed compliance program is
appropriately tailored training and communications.”).
117. Griffith, supra note 28, at 2081.
118. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 91–93 (1991); John Armour et al., The
Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 41, 50 (3d ed. 2017).
119. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 118, at 62–67.
120. See, e.g., id.
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oversight.121 But the choice of process may matter. In Part I.C.1,
we introduce two distinct ways in which a board can handle compliance oversight: first, by adding compliance oversight to the
remit of its existing audit committee, or second, by establishing
a distinct compliance committee. In Part I.C.2, we suggest that
the choice between these alternatives is not simply a cosmetic
matter, but may affect both the intensity of compliance oversight
and the cost to the company. In Part I.C.3, we support this view
with evidence about the way in which AC and CC charters allocate compliance oversight tasks. In Part I.C.4, we present case
studies of boards that have established CCs.
1. Compliance Oversight and Board Committees
Because public companies are required to establish an AC,
which has responsibility for internal financial controls,122 many
firms simply append compliance to the AC’s terms of reference.
Both audit and compliance oversight functions involve review of
executives’ implementation of a system of controls—financial
controls or a compliance program, respectively—and a role as arbiter of first instance of any conflicts that arise in relation to executives’ conduct and the system of controls or compliance.123
The core remit of the AC is essentially to oversee the company’s relationship with its auditors.124 This makes ACs an important component in the Sarbanes-Oxley regime for oversight
of internal financial controls. In addition to their central function
of ensuring integrity of the choice of auditor and handling the
periodic review by the auditor of firm financial information, ACs
also became responsible for managing the potential conflict created where internal irregularities came to light, or were alleged
by employees, where management were implicated or unwilling
to act. In order to ensure their independence in performing this
role, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires U.S. public

121. See, e.g., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 2019,
supra note 13; cases cited supra note 101.
122. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities
Act of 1933 Release No. 33-8220 (Apr. 9, 2003).
123. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 273–74 (2004).
124. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 2, 116 Stat. 745, 747
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7220 (2012)).
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companies to have audit committees staffed entirely by independent directors.125
It is easy to see that the AC’s function could lend itself to
becoming the channel through which the board exercises compliance oversight. Both ACs and CCs involve oversight of executives’ implementation of a system of controls—financial controls
or a compliance program, respectively—and a role as arbiter of
first instance of any conflicts that arise in relation to executives’
conduct and the system of controls or compliance.126 For this reason, many companies simply task their AC with oversight of the
firm’s compliance programs in general, as well as the core, and
more specific, role of oversight of financial controls.127
On the other hand, some firms have established distinct
CCs, likewise composed of independent directors. 128 When
staffed with different personnel from the AC, this opens up
greater bandwidth for engagement, permits the selection of individuals with different expertise, and facilitates any appropriate difference in ethos with respect to decision-making. Of
course, such division results in loss of potential complementarities from joint oversight of financial and non-financial compliance, making it desirable for there to be at least some overlap in
membership. Another approach, which preserves complementarities, is to retitle the AC as the “Audit and Compliance Committee,” reflecting a difference in emphasis as respects expertise and
role.129
2. Board Time as a Scarce Resource
We have seen that while some boards deal with compliance
oversight by adding it to the list of the AC’s responsibilities, others choose to establish a separate CC to handle compliance.
What difference does it make whether a board routes compliance
125. Id. § 301.
126. See Cunningham, supra note 123, at 273–74.
127. See id. at 301–06 (describing certain companies’ implementation of internal auditing controls).
128. For examples, see infra Part I.C.3.
129. See Deloitte, Boards: Understand the Rules for Ethics and Compliance
Oversight, WALL STREET J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (May 2, 2018), https://
deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2018/05/02/boards-understand-the-rules
-for-ethics-and-compliance-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/TY7Q-DEPF] (noting
also that “NYSE-listed companies are required to have the audit committee
oversee legal and regulatory compliance”).
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oversight through its AC or sets up a new CC? A skeptic might
see this as a merely cosmetic exercise. However, we believe there
are good reasons for thinking that the difference is material,
both in terms of the intensity of the oversight, and the cost to the
company.
Compliance officers and independent directors with whom
we spoke highlighted the real time commitment that arises from
the creation of a new committee. It generates another set of
meetings, documents to review, evaluative reports to write, all
in addition to the other responsibilities of the board members.
Independent director time is a scarce resource. Most public companies constrain their total board size, consistent with empirical
studies reporting that larger boards have reduced efficacy.130 At
the same time, to be classed as “independent,” a director must
not have an employment relationship with their company, meaning that they are of necessity a part-timer.131 This means that
time allocated to membership of a CC must be subtracted from
some other aspect of board functioning. The opportunity cost can
be very high. These industry professionals suggested that firms
would typically only reshape their board structure and create
compliance committees based on a strong external shock, like a
high-profile scandal or enforcement action. Otherwise, a firm
would prefer to focus on compliance through existing internal
governance structures.
3. Evidence on Compliance Oversight Intensity from
Committee Charters
It appears that where a CC is established, oversight of compliance is likely to be pursued more vigorously than where this
is simply added to the AC’s mandate. Reflecting their tighter focus, CC charters are more likely to contain specific deliverables
regarding the compliance oversight process. For example, CCs
are often tasked with periodic review of internal Codes of Conduct and the functioning of the company’s compliance program.132 In contrast, a typical audit committee will be expected
130. Joann S. Lublin, Small Boards Get Bigger Returns, WALL STREET J.
(Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/smaller-boards-get-bigger
-returns-1409078628 [https://perma.cc/Q63U-LHUC].
131. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 2, 116 Stat. 745,
751 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7220 (2012)).
132. See, e.g., CIGNA, COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE CHARTER (2019); GOLDMAN
SACHS BDC, INC., COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE CHARTER (2013); GOODYEAR TIRE
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to perform oversight functions mainly regarding financial matters. 133 This means that a CC is likely to establish a much
clearer, and more tightly controlled, reporting channel to the
Board from the company’s compliance function than would be
the case with an audit committee beyond financial matters. Both
CC and AC mandates will typically confer the power to retain
legal and other external experts as necessary to assist the committee.134 Some CC mandates also confer power to initiate and
conduct internal investigations into compliance,135 although this
is by no means universal.136
To lend context to our discussion of the way in which boards
allocate compliance oversight responsibility to their committees,
we conclude this Part with a discussion of three case studies of
firms that have chosen to establish distinct CCs.
4. Case Studies
In reflecting on the role of compliance committees, it is helpful to consider some case studies in which a CC has played an
active role. In each case, we draw on SEC filings and news reports to understand what the committee did, and how it came to
be formed.
LendingClub. The board of peer-to-peer lender LendingClub
probably lies at the opposite end of the compliance engagement
spectrum from the passive Wells Fargo board with which this
Article began. In 2016, following an internal review, an error of
& RUBBER CO., COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPLIANCE
CHARTER (2017); PG&E CORP., COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY COMMITTEE
CHARTER 2 (2019); QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC., QUALITY, SAFETY & COMPLIANCE
COMMITTEE CHARTER (2018); SW. AIRLINES CO., SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE CHARTER (2019) (on file with authors).
133. See, e.g., MERCK, AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARTER ¶¶ 6–7, 11 (2019), https://
www.merck.com/about/leadership/board-of-directors/Charter%20-%20Audit
%20Committee%20-%20May%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DVQ-CFRR].
134. CIGNA, supra note 132, at 2; GOLDMAN SACHS BDC, INC., supra note
132, at 3; GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., supra note 132, at 2; PG&E CORP.,
supra note 132, at 4; QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC., supra note 132, at 3; cf. SW.
AIRLINES CO., supra note 132, at 2 (specifying the committee may consult with
outside counsel).
135. CIGNA, supra note 132, at 2; QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INC., supra note 132,
at 2.
136. See, e.g., GOLDMAN SACHS BDC, INC., supra note 132; GOODYEAR TIRE
& RUBBER CO., supra note 132; PG&E CORP., supra note 132 (making no mention of investigations); SW. AIRLINES CO., supra note 132, at 2 (“It is not the
Committee’s responsibility to conduct investigations . . . .”).
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$22 million in loan sales was brought to the attention of the
LendingClub board.137 The board’s response was “swift and decisive,” including procuring the prompt resignation of the company’s founder-CEO.138 The board then assigned investigation of
what had gone wrong to a newly-formed board committee of independent directors, which retained outside counsel.139 This investigation uncovered additional problems, for which the board
decided promptly to reimburse investors for approximately $1
million of losses, as well as calling for the “termination or resignation of . . . senior managers involved” in the relevant loan
sales.140 Thus, the LendingClub board took a hands-on and active role in responding to a compliance problem, through the institution of a new committee specifically to handle the investigation. The fact that the company had “‘promptly self-reported its
executives’ misconduct following a review initiated by its board
of directors,” was a relevant factor for the DOJ and SEC in subsequently deciding not to prosecute the firm. 141 However, this
hands-on Board engagement with compliance did not result in
creation of an on-going compliance committee.
AIG. An example of a firm adopting a compliance committee
during an intensive regulatory investigation is AIG, which ultimately paid $1.6 billion to regulators, and created a new board
compliance committee before settling those actions. 142 In the
mid-2000s AIG faced prosecution for manipulating its financial
statement through use of reinsurance to create income.143 Before
137. Peter Rudegeair, LendingClub CEO Fired Over Faulty Loans, WALL
STREET J., May 9, 2016.
138. LendingClub Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 6, 2016).
139. Id. at 5.
140. Id.; LendingClub, Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 22, 2016);
SEC Charges Lending Club Asset Management and Former Executives with
Misleading Investors and Breaching Fiduciary Duty, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Press Release 2018-223 (Sept. 28, 2018) [hereinafter SEC Press Release],
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-223 [https://perma.cc/6EKZ
-76CV].
141. SEC Press Release, supra note 140.
142. Daniel Hays, AIG Pays $1.64 Billion To Settle Fraud Charges with
State, Federal Regulators, PROP. CASUALTY 360 (Feb. 12, 2006), https://www
.propertycasualty360.com/2006/02/12/aig-pays-1-64-billion-to-settle-fraud
-charges-with-state-federal-regulators/?slreturn=20190826184258 [https://
perma.cc/5K68-JAHC].
143. See Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & AIG Financial
Products Corp. (Nov. 30, 2004), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate
-prosecution-registry/agreements/aig-fp.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TJJ-WZ97].
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entering into a non-prosecution agreement, it created two board
committees to focus on compliance and regulation. 144 One of
those committees actually played a role in resolving the enforcement matter. The new Regulatory, Compliance and Legal Committee was led by Stephen L. Hammerman, a retired New York
City deputy police commissioner, which was “helping AIG executives negotiate a possible settlement with New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer and prepare a global compliance
program.”145 The creation of the new committee may have been
a vehicle for adding board members who could assist AIG with
such negotiations.
Las Vegas Sands. Our third case study illustrates the establishment of a compliance committee as a response to prosecutors’
requests. In 2013, Las Vegas Sands entered a non-prosecution
agreement with the DOJ for Bank Secrecy Act violations, under
the terms of which the company was required to create a compliance committee.146 The Compliance Committee Charter for Las
Vegas Sands Corp. specifies that the three directors on the committee shall all be independent directors. 147 That committee
meets at least four times a year, but with similar oversight responsibilities (although a specified focus on gaming law compliance and anti-corruption and money laundering law).148 When
Las Vegas Sands was prosecuted once more, this time for FCPA
violations, it settled the matter with another non-prosecution
agreement in 2017, which credited the firm for having a boardlevel compliance committee (it had “established a new Board of
Directors Compliance Committee.”).149
144. AIG Restructures Its Executive Governance, Adds 2 Outside Directors to
Board, INS. J. (Apr. 21, 2005), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
national/2005/04/21/54166.htm [https://perma.cc/EXQ7-DQ6D].
145. Joann S. Lublin, Compliance Panels Slowly Take Hold, WALL STREET
J. (Jan. 9, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113676266099241116 [https://
perma.cc/3WHU-AUW9].
146. See Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Attorney’s Office & Las Vegas
Sands Corp. (Aug. 26, 2013), https://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate
-prosecution-registry/agreements/Las-Vegas-Sands-Corp-NPA.pdf [http://
perma.cc/L4Y3-HJXJ].
147. Compliance Committee Charter, Las Vegas Sands Corp. (July 23, 2019),
https://s21.q4cdn.com/635845646/files/doc_downloads/committee-charters/
2019/Compliance-Committee-Charter-Final-July-23-2019.pdf [http://perma.cc/
7PHC-V74H].
148. Id.
149. See Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Section,
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In some of these cases, the CC was established during a period of very high internal focus on compliance, but in others, like
in the LendingClub example, no such committee was created. In
none of those cases in which a CC was established, was the relevant committee dissolved after the investigations had closed.
This evidence suggests that choosing to oversee compliance
through a separate committee is more than a cosmetic matter for
a Board, but something that carries real costs and plausibly has
an impact on the intensity of oversight.
In Part I.A, we outlined how and why regulators and prosecutors give firms incentives to establish internal compliance programs. We saw in Part I.B that both prosecutorial guidance and
corporate law fiduciary duties now envisage a role for boards
specifically in overseeing such internal compliance programs,
and that this may entail mediating conflict between senior executives and such programs. In Part I.C, we considered particular
ways in which boards may perform their compliance oversight
function, comparing the adoption of a stand-alone CC with the
addition of compliance oversight to the AC’s list of duties. The
choice between these is not dictated either by prosecutorial guidance or by fiduciary duties. While establishing a CC seems likely
to permit more intense compliance oversight, it is also likely to
be more costly for boards to establish and staff. In Part II, we
present our empirical findings about the extent of CC adoption
by public companies, and the attributes of companies most likely
to adopt them.
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BOARD COMPLIANCE
In this Part, we present novel empirical data and analysis
to help understand how and why corporate boards respond to the
challenge of compliance oversight. Despite the recent emphasis
on the board’s role in corporate compliance, to our surprise we
find that the vast majority (nearly 94%) of U.S. public companies
do not have compliance committees at the board level. That said,
the number of public companies that do have such committees is
slowly increasing, and we find higher rates of adoption in certain
highly regulated industries. Moreover, creation of a compliance

Criminal Division & Las Vegas Sands Corp. (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/929836/download [https://perma.cc/FK2M
-SUBP].
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committee is more likely among firms with a history of prosecution and with outside directors who previously served on other
boards that had compliance committees. In Subpart A, we summarize the prior literature on corporate compliance activities,
then describe the sources of our data, provide an overview of
these data, including by detailing our results in a time trend. In
Subpart B, we examine to what degree board compliance committees are required, either by the SEC or in prosecution agreements. In Subpart C, we ask why a company might create a CC,
presenting results concerning cases in which CC adoption is voluntary. In Subpart D, we present results concerning the types of
companies in which boards adopt CC’s.
A. NEW DATA ON BOARD COMPLIANCE
1. Prior Literature
There is a general dearth of academic empirical literature
on corporate compliance activities. The central challenge in identifying compliance investment is that firms generally do not disclose details about their compliance programs.150 To understand
why not, note first that securities laws do not mandate disclosure
of compliance expenditure.151 Moreover, managers and directors
have no incentive to volunteer this information. 152 This is because disclosing an investment in compliance may be taken as a
signal that the firm considers the risk of malfeasance sufficient
to make its compliance investment worthwhile and feels obliged
to provide notice of that risk to its shareholders.153 Because even
the most effective compliance program cannot entirely deflect
the costs of prosecution, the stock price may fall. As managers
and directors are both paid primarily in stock, they are likely to
prefer to avoid this.154
150. Griffith, supra note 28.
151. Id.
152. A well-known justification for mandatory disclosure in securities regulation is that in a purely voluntary disclosure regime, managers will disclose too
little. The most general reason given is that managers will prefer not to share
with their competitors information that is a source of competitive advantage.
See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999). The incentive
problem we identify here in relation to compliance investment is more specific,
and likely more intense, than this general rationale.
153. See Armour et al., supra note 31.
154. Id. at 22.
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Firms, however, are required to report the existence of a
compliance committee. 155 Such “corporate governance” information is part of the mandatory disclosure associated with the
annual proxy solicitation for the election of directors.156 Shortly
after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, public companies came to
be required to disclose charters of their audit, compensation and
nomination committees.157 This led to a practice of companies
disclosing charters of every board committee, presumably to
avoid any potentially misleading omissions regarding the interpretation of the charters of the three committees for which disclosure is mandated. As a result, it is possible to compile a dataset of board compliance committees and their charters.158
Nevertheless, board compliance committees have themselves been little studied. The only prior empirical literature
about board compliance comes in the form of practitioner surveys, typically conducted by large accounting firms. For example, PwC’s annual State of Compliance report, a widely-cited
source for compliance literature,159 stated in 2016 that “20% [of
companies] have Boards of Directors that formed a separate,
155. Indeed, we argue below that signal conveyed by adoption of a Compliance Committee—a costly investment in compliance that is subject to mandatory disclosure—is a significant explanatory factor for the low adoption rate.
156. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2019) (containing Item 407 of Regulation S-K
referenced by Schedule 14A); id. § 240.14a-101 (2000) (specifying content of
Schedule 14A and Item 7 (Directors and Executive Officers)). The regulation
requires disclosure of attendance of directors at board meetings and committee
meetings, which of course requires identification of all board committees.
157. SEC Rules have required disclosure of audit committee charters since
2000 (originally a triennial obligation) in the firm’s proxy statements. See id.
§ 240.14a-101, Item 7(e)(3). This was extended to an annual obligation in the
financial statements in 2003. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(i)(2) (2003). The NYSE
Listed Company Manual was amended in 2003 to require all NYSE-listed companies to have and disclose audit, compensation, and nomination committee
charters. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Change and Amendment Relating to Corporate Governance, Release No. 3447672, SEC Docket No. SR-NYSE-2002-33 (Apr. 11, 2003). Nomination committee charter disclosure in proxy statements has also been required by SEC Rules
since the beginning of 2004. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 7(d)(2)(ii)(A)
(2004). In 2006, these rules were consolidated into SEC Regulation 407. See 71
Fed. Reg. 53,254 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.407).
158. In most cases, information on a company’s board committees are under
the “Investor Relations” tab on the company’s website.
159. Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance
into Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285 (2017); Griffith, supra note
28.
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stand-alone compliance/ethics committee.” 160 The representativeness of these figures is, however, questionable when attention is paid to the survey methodology. PwC states that the survey was conducted on “more than 800 executives globally,” most
of whom are compliance professionals in both private and public
companies.161 Because the report is based on respondents’ voluntary return of the survey, there is a concern that the survey responses were submitted disproportionately from those who work
at firms that already have a strong focus on compliance. In this
Article, we seek to assess whether these surveys, and the recent
literature on the effect of enforcement on compliance practices,
correctly assert that firms so commonly form such committees at
the board level. For the largest companies in terms of market
capitalization, a recent article by EY, another major accounting
firm, reported that 16% of S&P 500 companies have compliance
committees based on the companies’ proxy statement filed in
2018.162 Upon closer examination, this report picks up all committees that may undertake any compliance function rather
than committees that are specifically called “compliance committees.” Using our more restrictive (but still quite inclusive) definition, we find that the fraction of S&P 500 companies with compliance committees increased from 5.3% to 6.8% over the 2004–
2017 period, a considerably lower fraction.163
Another strand of prior literature considers the impact of
criminal prosecutions on board structure. A number of scholars
have noted the often-extensive scope of the matters negotiated
with prosecutors as part of a DPA. In addition to large financial
penalties, DPAs frequently mandate enhancements to existing
internal compliance programs, cooperation with investigations,
the appointment of an independent corporate monitor, and, in
some cases, changes to corporate governance structures. 164 Of
160. PWC, STATE OF COMPLIANCE STUDY 2016: LAYING A STRATEGIC FOUNDATION FOR STRONG COMPLIANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 3 (2016), https://
www.pwc.se/sv/pdf-reports/state-of-compliance-study-2016.pdf [https://perma
.cc/FVC8-XGVQ].
161. Id., Foreword.
162. EY CTR FOR BRD MATTERS, A FRESH LOOK AT BOARD COMMITTEES
(2018), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-cbm-a-fresh-look-at
-board-committees/$FILE/ey-cbm-a-fresh-look-at-board-committees.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5R8G/RMUU]. The report is based on the 418 proxy statements filed on May 15, 2018. Id.
163. See infra Table 3.
164. See generally Arlen & Kahan, supra note 33 (examining the practice of
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particular relevance is Kaal and Lacine (2014), which evaluates
corporate governance-related provisions in all publicly available
DPAs (N = 271) over the period 1993–2013. They report that 8%
of these DPAs (meaning, 22) contained provisions requiring the
company concerned to make changes to its existing board structures, “often creating new board committees.”165 This suggests
that entry into a DPA may sometimes be a trigger for the establishment of a compliance committee. However, the low absolute
number of such prosecutions of public companies means that this
form of prosecutorial settling-up cannot account for the extent of
CC adoption.166
2. Data Sources and Sample Description
Our empirical study utilizes four main data sources:
(1) BoardEx: an extensive database detailing board membership
and structure, including committees, to determine whether companies have established a CC, and if so, when;167 (2) Duke/UVA
Corporate Prosecution Registry: an extensive database on corporate prosecutions including plea agreements, trial convictions,
and all DPAs entered into by the DOJ with organizations from
1990 onwards to explore links between the exposure to corporate
prosecution and CC adoption;168 (3) CRSP-Compustat: a widelyused financial dataset with details of firm financial attributes
such as firm performance and firm size;169 and (4) SEC EDGAR:
DPA-mandated reforms and discussing appropriate application); Garrett,
Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 33 (discussing the background and
examples of DPA-required internal reforms).
165. Kaal & Lacine, supra note 34, at 95–96.
166. See GARRETT, supra note 8, at 267 (describing how from 2001 to 2012,
273 public companies were prosecuted).
167. Data, BOARDEX, http://corp.boardex.com/data/ [https://perma.cc/7MRK
-N59D]. BoardEx has data from 1999, but the inclusion of public companies is
incomplete prior to 2004 mainly because companies were not under regulatory
pressure to disclose committee information. In 2003, the SEC approved major
stock exchange rules on board committees (e.g., audit, compensation, and nomination board committees.). See, e.g., Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule
Change Relating to Corporate Governance, Release No. 34-50625, SEC Docket
No. SR-NYSE-2004-41 (Nov. 3, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/34
-50625.pdf [https://perma.cc/4THH-4GST]; SEC Marketplace Rules, NASDAQ
Rule § 4350(d), SEC, https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/nasdaqllcf1a4_5/
nasdaqllcamendrules4000.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NE8-3EDM].
168. The Corporate Prosecution Registry was co-created by one of the authors. Ashley & Garrett, supra note 35.
169. CRSP-Compustat Merged, CTR. FOR RES. IN SECURITY PRICES,
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listed companies’ periodic filings and proxy statements to crossreference information about companies. 170 By merging these
four major data sources, we compiled a dataset to examine the
interaction between ex-post enforcement and ex-ante governance changes. Our dataset consists of a panel of 6372 unique U.S.
public companies for the period 2004–2017, giving a total of
51,620 firm-years. Table 1 sets out the details of variable names,
variable descriptions, and data sources. Table 2 presents summary statistics for each variable.

http://www.crsp.com/products/research-products/crspcompustat-merged
-database [https://perma.cc/75Z8-DR9P].
170. See Edgar Company Search, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/
searchedgar/companysearch.html [https://perma.cc/X4K5-3XEF].
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Table 1. Variable Descriptions
Variable Name
Compliance
Committee
DOJ Enforcement
DOJ Exposure

CC Interlock
Ave. Dir. Age
Male Board
Board Size
Aud. Cttee. Ratio
NonExecDir.
Ratio
Delaware Inc.

Variable Description
Dummy for whether firm has a board-level
Compliance Committee (including standalone compliance committee, compliance
and risk, or audit and compliance)
Dummy for DOJ enforcement during previous three years
Rate of prosecution in the same industry
(under Fama-French 48 industry classification) during previous three years
Dummy for firm having at least one director who concurrently serves on board of
another company with a Compliance Committee
Average age of board members
Ratio of male board members
Number of board members
Ratio of Audit Committee members to entire board members
Ratio of non-executive directors to total
board members.
Dummy for Delaware incorporation

Firm Size

Natural logarithm of book value of firm’s
total assets

RoA (t-1)

Return on assets in previous year

Tobin’s Q (t-1)

Ratio of firm’s market value to book value
of its assets in previous year

Source
BoardEx
Duke-UVA Corporate Prosecution
Registry
Duke-UVA Corporate Prosecution
Registry/BoardEx
BoardEx
BoardEx
BoardEx
BoardEx
BoardEx
BoardEx
SEC EDGAR
CRSP-Compustat
Merged-Fundamental Annual
CRSP-Compustat
Merged-Fundamental Annual
CRSP-Compustat
Merged-Fundamental Annual
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Variable Name
Compliance
Committee
DOJ Enforcement

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Median

Min

Max

50,945

0.04

0.19

0

0

1

50,945

0.01

0.10

0

0

1

DOJ Exposure

50,945

0.002

0.004

0.001

0

0.04

CC Interlock
Director Average Age

50,945

0.18

0.39

0

0

1

50,945

61.33

5.17

61.6

33.5

82.17

Male Board

50,945

0.90

0.10

0.90

0.20

1.00

Board Size
Audit Committee Ratio
NonExecDir.
Ratio

50,945

8.94

2.72

9

2

26

50,945

0.48

0.13

0.44

0171

1.00

50,945

0.83

0.10

0.86

0.20

1.00

Delaware Inc.

50,945

0.57

0.49

1

0

1

Firm Size:
log(total assets)

50,945

6.52

2.10

6.53

1.70

12.33

RoA (t-1)

48,360

-0.03

0.22

0.03

-1.57

0.32

Tobin’s Q (t-1)

48,385

1.95

1.47

1.42

0.47

10.85

3. Time Trends and Industry Distribution
Figure 1 shows the number (vertical axis) and proportion
(bold numbers) of U.S. public companies having used a Compliance Committee during the period 2004–2017. We take a Compliance Committee for these purposes to include (i) a stand-alone
compliance committee, (ii) a “Risk and Compliance Committee”
or (iii) restyling an audit committee as “Audit and Compliance”
during the relevant period. While the trend is slowly and consistently upward, the overall level remains low, with only 4.85%
of public companies having adopted such a committee by 2017.

171. In 2004, Sutron Corporation did not have an audit committee. SUTRON
CORP., 2004 DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (2005), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/728331/000072833105000038/proxy05.txt [https://perma
.cc/8L39-B4M9] (“The Board does not have an audit committee or nominating
committee.”).
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Figure 1. Time Trend in Compliance Committee Adoptions,
2004–17

Note: Our sample companies represent all U.S. public companies from
BoardEx, excluding investment funds and trusts. The dashed line
shows the total number of public companies that have a Compliance
Committee at the board level. The solid line shows the percentage of
public companies that have a Compliance Committee at the board
level. “Compliance Committee” includes any board committee that uses
the term “compliance” in its official name.

Our findings are in marked contrast to the results reported
in the PwC survey, which estimated that 20% of companies had
established a CC by 2016.172 Our data suggest CCs are used far
less frequently than had previously been believed to be the case.
It appears likely that the survey was carried out with PwC’s clients, raising an obvious issue of selection bias: firms that have
compliance officers are likely to report that they engage in other
compliance activities. A more recent article by EY reported that
16% of S&P 500 companies had compliance committees in
2018.173

172. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
173. See EY CENTER FOR BOARD MATTERS, supra note 162. The report is
based on the 418 proxy statements filed as of May 15, 2018.
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Table 3 shows the industry distribution of firms that have
established CCs. Industry classification is according to the
Fama-French 48-industry classification (FFI48) scheme. 174 As
can be seen in Table 3, the industries that are the heaviest
adopters of CCs are banking, healthcare, pharmaceutical products, medical equipment, and business services. An intuitive explanation is that these industries are all heavily regulated; in
most cases some form of compliance program is mandated by
substantive regulation.175 Firms that are required to set up a
compliance program are presumably more likely to find it worthwhile to establish a committee at the board level to oversee that
program.
Table 3. Top 5 Industries of firms adopting Compliance
Committees, 2004–17
Industry (FFI48)

% of companies from each industry out of entire companies
with CC

Banking

28.00%

Healthcare

12.46%

Pharmaceutical Products

12.14%

Medical Equipment

8.62%

Business Services

7.67%

In Table 4 we compare, by industry, the proportion of firms
that faced DOJ enforcement, and the proportion of firms that
adopted compliance committees over the period 2004–17. There
is not an obvious relationship. Firms in the pharmaceutical, utilities, and medical equipment industries, which have relatively

174. Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Industry Cost of Equity, 43 J. FIN.
ECON. 153 (1997). See generally THE WHARTON SCH., UNIV. OF PENN., PROCEDURES USING FAMA AND FRENCH 48 INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATIONS (1993),
https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/support/research-wrds/research
-guides/procedures-using-fama-and-french-48-industry-classification/
[https://perma.cc/Q6PH-BSGU] (showing Fama-French industry classifications). Fama-French 48 Industry Classifications were created by using each
company’s four-digit Standard Industrial Classification collected from EDGAR.
Id.
175. For examples of such statutes, see supra note 157.
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high rates of CC adoption, also have two of the highest prosecution rates during our sample period. However, the same is not
true for banking and healthcare, which have relatively low prosecution rates yet high rates of CC adoption. Moreover, while the
aircraft industry has the highest prosecution rate of any industry over our sample period, no company in the industry has
adopted a CC.
Table 4. Likelihood of DOJ enforcement and frequency of
Compliance Committee adoptions by industry, 2004–17
Industry Classification
(FFI 48)

Total
Firms

% of Prosecuted Firms

3

24

12.50%

0%

66

8

74

10.81%

2.70%

12

1

13

7.69%

0%

127

10

137

7.30%

2.19%

67

5

72

6.94%

0%

190

14

204

6.86%

1.47%

14

1

15

6.67%

0%

Agriculture

17

1

18

5.56%

0%

Chemicals

106

6

112

5.36%

0%

208

10

218

4.59%

1.83%

Almost Nothing

47

2

49

4.08%

2.04%

Pharmaceutical
Products

499

19

518

3.67%

2.90%

161

6

167

3.59%

0.6%

108

4

112

3.57%

2.68%

166

6

172

3.49%

2.33%

Printing and Publishing

56

2

58

3.45%

0%

Apparel

58

2

60

3.33%

0%

Construction

61

2

63

3.17%

4.76%

Electrical Equipment

61

2

63

3.17%

0%

Business Supplies

35

1

36

2.78%

0%

Aircraft
Food Products
Shipbuilding, Railroad
Utilities
Automobiles and
Truck
Petroleum and Natural
Coal

Medical Equipment

Wholesale
Transportation
Insurance

Non-Prosecuted
Firms
21

Prosecuted
Firms

% of CC
use
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Non-Prosecuted
Firms
149

Prosecuted
Firms
4

153

2.61%

1.96%

119

3

122

2.46%

2.46%

199

5

204

2.45%

1.47%

Retail

274

6

280

2.14%

1.43%

Banking

753

16

769

2.08%

5.98%

114

2

116

1.72%

28.44%

Restaurants, Hotels,
Motels

115

2

117

1.71%

2.56%

Steel Works Etc.

64

1

65

1.54%

0%

Construction Material

70

1

71

1.41%

1.40%

Personal Services

71

1

72

1.39%

0%

805

7

812

0.86%

1.97%

Electronic Equipment

365

2

367

0.55%

1.36%

Beer & Liquor

18

0

18

0%

0%

5

0

5

0%

0%

Communication

175

0

175

0%

0%

Consumer Goods

64

0

64

0%

0%

12

0

12

0%

0%

72

0

72

0%

2.78%

Fabricated Products

16

0

16

0%

0%

Non-Metallic and
Industrial Metal
Mining

30

0

30

0%

3.33%

Precious Metals

10

0

10

0%

0%

55

0

55

0%

0%

34

0

34

0%

2.94%

Rubber and Plastic
Products
Shipping Containers

37

0

37

0%

0%

10

0

10

0%

0%

Textiles

13

0

13

0%

0%

Tobacco Products

8

0

8

0%

0%

397

0

397

0%

1.76%

Machinery
Measuring and
Control
Computers

Healthcare

Business Services

Candy & Soda

Defense
Entertainment

Real Estate
Recreation

Trading

Total
Firms
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% of Prosecuted Firms

% of CC
use
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4. Types and Composition of Board Compliance Committees
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of compliance committee
adoption by three different types of nomenclature (namely: a
stand-alone “Compliance Committee”, a “Risk and Compliance
Committee” without a stand-alone Compliance Committee, and
re-naming the audit committee as “Audit and Compliance” without a stand-alone Compliance Committee) over the period 2004–
2017. As can be seen in Figure 2, a stand-alone Compliance Committee is by far the most frequent way in which a compliance
committee is explicitly recognized at the board level.
Figure 2. Types of Compliance Committees by Years,
2004–17

Note: Our sample companies represent all U.S. public companies from
BoardEx, excluding investment funds and trusts. For a given year,
solid bars show the number of public companies with a “stand-alone”
Compliance Committee; bars with dots show the number of public companies with a “Risk and Compliance Committee”; and bars with diagonals show the number of public companies with an Audit committee
restyled as an “Audit and Compliance Committee.”

Table 5 below provides descriptive statistics on the composition of board compliance committees in our study period. The
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average compliance committee has three members; of those
members, more than 85% are independent directors. Moreover,
about 30% of compliance committee members contemporaneously serve on their company’s Audit committee. Conversely, approximately 10% of compliance committee members sit exclusively on that committee. On average, compliance committee
members have been served as board members of the company for
7.6 years.
Table 5. Characteristics of Board Compliance Committees
of US Public Companies, 2004–17.
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Size of CC

1,863

4.43

1.68

1

15

Ratio of NonExecDir.

1,863

0.85

0.21

0

1

Ratio of Audit committee
Members on CC

1,863

0.31

0.46

0

1

Ratio of Directors
Exclusively Serve on CC

1,863

0.10

0.19

0

1

These data suggest that CC adoption is actually quite low
amongst U.S. public companies; certainly, considerably lower
than had previously been thought to be the case. In light of this,
we would like to understand the factors that make firms more or
less likely to adopt compliance committees.
B. ARE FIRMS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH COMPLIANCE
COMMITTEES?
A threshold question is whether adoption of a board-level
CC is voluntary or compelled. If firms adopt CCs only where compelled, this would imply that the low take-up is because firms
generally do not see CCs as valuable. In this section, we investigate how much of CC adoption is explicable in this way. The lack
of a board-level compliance committee does not directly violate
any current substantive regulations. 176 There are regulatory
mandates for compliance, but not mandates requiring the creation of a board level committee. However, there are two potential
exceptions to this: Qualified Legal Compliance Committees and
Prosecution Agreements.
176. See text accompanying note 60, supra.
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1. Qualified Legal Compliance Committees
The first possible route to a mandatory CC is via the SEC
Rule on “Qualified Legal Compliance Committees” (QLCC)
promulgated in 2003 as part of the post-Enron concern about corporate compliance. 177 Although Rule 205 does not mandate a
board level compliance committee, it permits a version of such a
committee to be used as an alternate mechanism for “up the ladder” mandatory reporting of material misconduct observed by
the company’s outside attorneys.178 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act required attorneys to report evidence of material misconduct to the
company’s chief legal officer and/or chief executive officer,179 and
if these persons do not respond properly, to the audit committee
or the entire board of directors. 180 As an exception to this requirement, the SEC offered an alternative reporting mechanism
for attorneys. If the issuer establishes a QLCC, attorneys may
fulfill their reporting obligation by reporting the matter to the
QLCC.181 When the rule was first introduced, some commentators suggested firms whose attorneys found the standard reporting channel onerous would establish QLCCs.182
This might consequently be a channel through which some
companies felt it necessary to establish compliance committees.183
However, the SEC’s definition of a QLCC for these purposes
does not require a stand-alone committee.184 Any committee that
includes at least two independent directors and one audit committee member—including the Audit committee itself—qualifies
as a “QLCC.” 185 Thus an issuer motivated solely by Rule 205
177. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2010); see also Jill Fisch & Caroline Gentile, The
Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to
Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 523 (2003).
178. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).
179. Id.; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 307, 116
Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012)).
180. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3).
181. Id. § 205.3(c)(1).
182. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 177, at 547 (“These attorneys face less
work, uncertainty, and exposure to liability when reporting to a QLCC.”).
183. See Robert Eli Rosen, Resistances to Reforming Corporate Governance:
The Diffusion of QLCC’s, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251 (2005) (explaining the need
for compliance committees).
184. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).
185. Id. § 205.2(k)(1).
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would generally find it much more straightforward to constitute
the Audit committee as the “QLCC” for these purposes, rather
than to go to the trouble of establishing a new stand-alone compliance committee.186 This suggests that Rule 205 is unlikely to
have been a significant driver of compliance committee creation.
To verify this, we searched our data for examples where
firms had established stand-alone QLCCs, as opposed to simply
designating the Audit committee for this purpose. We found that
the number of active stand-alone QLCCs has always been very
low and has decreased over the years. Its peak was in 2004 when
the concept was first introduced; in that year, twenty companies
inaugurated stand-alone QLCCs. These amounted to 14% of the
total number of companies with stand-alone compliance committees at that point (136). The number of QLCCs fell steadily over
the period of our study, such that by 2017, only three public companies (ArcBest Corp., Brunswick Corp., and Comerica Inc.) retained stand-alone QLCCs. That was less than 2% of the total
companies with stand-alone compliance committees (157).
Clearly, SEC Rule 205 has not stimulated a significant number
of compliance committee formations in our dataset.
2. Prosecution Agreements
A second circumstance in which companies might be required to adopt CCs would be if this were demanded by prosecutors as part of a DPA or other settlement, as in our case study of
Las Vegas Sands.187 But how frequently does this happen? To
shed light on this, we reviewed the text of all prosecution agreements entered with public companies since 2001 in the Duke &
University of Virginia Corporate Prosecution Registry.188 There
are 381 public firms in the Registry that were prosecuted during
the period from 2001–2018. Thirteen received declinations, one
was acquitted at trial, four received pre-trial dismissals, and
three received trial convictions; those cases are not examined
here.

186. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 177, at 542; Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 823 (2001).
187. See supra Part I.C.4; see also Kaal & Lacine, supra note 34, at 85 fig.1
(finding that 31% of agreements had requirements affecting boards, but only 8%
mandated new board committees).
188. See Ashley & Garrett, supra note 35.
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In this analysis, we focus on the 374 public firms prosecuted
in that registry, including the 192 that entered into deferred and
non-prosecution agreements and the 168 that entered into plea
agreements.189 This dataset is significantly larger than that previously considered by Kaal and Lacine, primarily because we include plea agreements as well as DPAs.190 However, our data do
not include compliance undertakings that may also be ordered
as part of court-supervised probation, since the terms of special
probation are not always available on judicial dockets.191
We coded all agreements that referred to the board by imposing any new affirmative obligation on the board (as opposed
to not referring to the board at all or acknowledging prior acts of
the board with respect to compliance). Of the 374 cases, the text
of 45 public companies’ agreements are missing; they are not
available on dockets or were not made available by the Department of Justice. Of the 329 remaining cases, 115 (35%) included
terms that imposed some obligation on the board. 192 Of those
cases, only five agreements (1.5%) required the creation of boardlevel compliance committees. 193 Prosecutors clearly do not demand that boards establish CCs as part of plea agreements or

189. We do not examine the cases of thirteen more public companies that
received declinations, four dismissals, three convictions at trial, and one acquittal at trial.
190. Kaal & Lacine, supra note 34, at 84 (describing the author’s dataset
reviewing 271 DPAs entered into from 1993–2013).
191. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 12, § 8D1.4, Application n.1.
192. This is consistent with Kaal and Lacine’s finding that 38% of DPAs in
their sample required some type of “board changes.” Kaal & Lacine, supra note
34, at 95.
193. The Computer Associates Agreement from 2004 required the company
to establish a compliance committee (or a combined audit and compliance committee), as well as add two independent directors to its board, and create a new
audit department that reports to the new board committee. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Comput. Assocs. Int’l (2004),
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/detail-files/
589.html [https://perma.cc/2F9T-9F22]. The 2008 Unum Group agreement required the establishment of a new compliance committee of the Board. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Unum Grp. Agreement
(2008), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/detail
-files/738.html [https://perma.cc/ZWE3-36KV]. The 2012 Moneygram International agreement required the bank to create “an Independent Compliance and
Ethics Committee of the Board of Directors with direct oversight of the Chief
Compliance Officer and the Compliance Program” and responsibility “for ensur-
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DPAs.194 To be sure, some other cases may also involve parallel
agreements with regulators who themselves imposed obligations
on the board. Nevertheless, it seems that firms very rarely create
compliance committees because prosecutors negotiate them as
part of a DPA or plea agreement.
What we learn from the combination of these inquiries is
that the vast majority of the firms that establish compliance
committees are not compelled to do so. Rather, it is a voluntary
decision.
C. WHY MIGHT FIRMS CHOOSE TO ESTABLISH COMPLIANCE
COMMITTEES?
These observations shift our focus to the cases in which CC
adoption is voluntary; where boards choose to oversee compliance through a separate committee. Given that less than 5% of
public companies established a CC between 2004–2017, these
firms are early adopters of the new corporate practice. As discussed in Part I.C, adopting a CC has real costs for a firm’s board
but also has a real significance in terms of enhanced oversight
capability. What are the factors that might make a firm choose
to do so? In this subpart, we consider three: heightened compliance activity, the availability of capacity among board members,
and the gradual diffusion of information about CCs.

ing that the Company is in compliance with all aspects of the Agreement.” Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Moneygram Int’l (2012),
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/agreements/
MoneyGram.pdf [https://perma.cc/C855-LCLB]. The non-prosecution agreement with Las Vegas Sands required the creation of a board-level compliance
agreement. Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Las Vegas
Sands Corp. (2013), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution
-registry/agreements/Las-Vegas-Sands-Corp-NPA.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW9S
-SA88]. The 2014 Stryker Corp. agreement required the creation of a new compliance committee and that the Board, or a designated committee, “shall conduct a review of the effectiveness of Stryker’s Compliance Program as it relates
to the marketing, promotion, and sale of medical devices.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice
& Stryker Corp., Plea Agreement (2014), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/
corporate-prosecution-registry/detail-files/770.html [https://perma.cc/R7DS
-8BZV].
194. The finding is qualitatively similar to that reported by Kaal & Lacine,
supra note 34, at 96 (finding that just 8% of firms had adopted a compliance
committee after prosecution).
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1. Heightened Compliance Activity
All other things equal, a CC would be most useful for companies in which it could complement other large investments in
compliance programs. Where a firm has an extensive compliance
program, the compliance oversight intensity a CC can deliver
would be useful to enhance the effectiveness of that program.
Neither the absolute level of, nor an increase in, compliance investments is readily measurable in most contexts because, as we
have described in Part II.A.1, firms typically do not disclose the
scope of their compliance activity, in part because of fear of sending an adverse signal. 195 Nevertheless, there are a number of
readily-identifiable circumstances that might be expected to be
associated with an increase in compliance investment so that
compliance committee adoption would not carry the usual negative signal.196 Thus, firms are free to exploit the complementarities.
One relevant indicator may be an enforcement event, such
as prosecution or a DPA. When firms enter into DPAs—a public
event with high salience—they commonly agree to increase their
pre-existing level of compliance activity. 197 And in the period
leading up to a DPA, firms may invest heavily in conducting an
internal investigation and co-operating with the authorities.
Such a ramping-up of compliance investment could also be a trigger for boards stepping in to engage in more direct oversight
through a CC, as in the cases of LendingClub and AIG, even if
this is not specifically mandated by prosecutors.
This conjecture is borne out in our dataset of DPAs and plea
agreements. While prosecutors very rarely require establishment of a compliance committee,198 many of these agreements
nevertheless envisage expansions in compliance that will involve
the board in some way. Ninety-six (29%) of these prosecution
agreements created new positions that report directly to the
board.199 In some of those cases, still more is required, such as
195. See supra Part II.A.1.
196. See Elizabeth Daniels, Note, Getting DPA Review and Rejection Right,
16 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 120 (2016) (“[A]ll DPAs in this area require continued cooperation, heightened compliance mechanisms, and law-abiding conduct measured over a set period of time . . . .”).
197. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 8, at 71–72.
198. See supra Part II.B.2.
199. For example, seventy-one settlements, chiefly in FCPA cases, contained
the following language, requiring the company to: “Assign responsibility to one
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that the compliance officer must make at least quarterly reports
to the board. Some agreements required creation of a compliance
officer for a specific compliance risk, such as the Online Pharmacy Compliance Officer created in the United Parcel Service
agreement.200 On the other hand, some cases specifically suggest
a more occasional role. The Monsanto agreement, for example,
asks that the board hire an outside auditor to assess its FCPA
compliance not less than once every five years.201 In additional
cases, an independent monitor is appointed, and the reports of
that monitor would be normally reviewed by the board (even if
the publicly released agreement does not say so specifically).
Some agreements do discuss the board-monitor relationship. For
example, the Exactech case requires that the Chairman of the
Board, CEO, President, CFO, Executive Vice President for R&D,
Corporate Counsel, and Chief Compliance Officer all meet quarterly with the Monitor.202 Such a role would end when the agreement ends.203
While there is variation in individual agreements, the general thrust is for DPAs to impose heightened compliance obligations on the company, and, in one-third of cases, directly to expect more board engagement. While these do not direct the board

or more senior corporate executives for the implementation and oversight of the
company’s anti-corruption compliance policies. These officials shall have authority to report directly to independent monitoring bodies, the company’s board
of directors, and shall have an adequate level of autonomy from management.”
See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Zimmer Biomet (2017), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/
agreements/zimmer-biomet-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG76-DXDE].
200. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & United Parcel
Serv. (2013), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/
agreements/UPS.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7KF-9GVV].
201. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Monsanto Co.
(2005), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/
agreements/monsanto.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MX9-Y9XZ].
202. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Exactech, Inc.
(2010), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/
agreements/exactech.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B7G-4CC9].
203. Some agreements similarly state that the board must review compliance pursuant to the agreement during the term of the agreement, without imposing a further ongoing obligation. See, e.g., Plea Agreement, United States v.
AmerisourceBergen Specialty Grp., No. 1:17-CR-00507-NG (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,
2017), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/
agreements/amerisourcebergen.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6KQ-N976].
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to establish a CC, the heightened compliance investment and associated oversight expectations may be expected to make it more
likely for such companies to establish a CC. A DPA is often a
trigger for a step up in compliance by the company; this in turn
should be a cause for increased oversight. Board committee oversight makes internal compliance efforts more effective; heightened internal compliance provides more compliance-relevant information to funnel to the board committee, making oversight
more effective.
Risk of prosecution is, of course, hard to measure, especially
where it turns on factors that are internal to the firm. However,
it seems reasonable to expect that firms in regulated industries
may expect heightened scrutiny of their actions.204 Another relevant indicator may be rates of prosecution in a firm’s industry
in recent years. This can convey information about the resources
and enforcement priorities of prosecutors, which vary over time.
Thirdly, with respect in particular to exposure to prosecution under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, one might expect this to
be highest for firms that do business in corruption-prone jurisdictions.205
2. Board Capacity
Our discussion in this Part has so far focused on benefits to
firms from establishing a CC. Yet as we saw in Part I.C, the costs
may also be significant, given the scarcity of independent directors’ time. Consequently, the structure of a firm’s board may affect its willingness to contemplate setting up a new compliance
committee, as opposed to channeling compliance work to the existing AC. A new compliance committee will require personnel—
primarily independent directors—to staff it. We know from our
interview research206 that independent directors, who have only
part-time relationships with their companies, face very tight
time constraints. Consequently, we might expect that firms with
larger boards, and in particular, with more independent directors, would be more likely to establish a CC. The flipside of the
204. Such firms may have additional reasons for investing in compliance
programs, as aspects of these may be required by the applicable regulation.
205. See generally Stefan Zeume, Bribes and Firm Value, 30 REV. FIN.
STUDS. 1457 (documenting effects on firms with subsidiaries in countries prone
to corruption from passage of FCPA-equivalent legislation in the U.K.).
206. See infra Part III.A.2.
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same issue is the AC’s capacity to take on compliance oversight
work. The larger a firm’s AC, the greater the capacity for compliance oversight to be routed through the AC as opposed to the
inauguration of a new CC.
3. Learning Costs
The pattern of CC adoption—rare, but gradually increasing
over time—is consistent with other types of innovation in corporate governance. Even if new mechanisms are beneficial, it is
costly for boards facing tight time constraints to learn about
these benefits.207 These learning costs put a brake on the diffusion of new practices. As a consequence, boards may be more
likely to adopt a new innovation of which one or more of their
members have prior experience in a different context—for example, through sitting on the board of a different company at which
the innovation has been deployed. Prior studies suggest that interlocking directors (that is, directors who serve on the boards of
more than one company concurrently) can function as a transmission mechanism for learning about a range of new corporate

207. See infra Part I.C (explaining that the scarcity of a director’s time may
increase the cost of implementation).
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governance practices. 208 These include poison pill adoption, 209
CEO compensation, 210 option backdating, 211 and indemnification protection.212 Applied to our current context, it may be that
directors who have experienced a compliance committee in operation at another company may be a source of information for colleagues about the benefits (or costs) of these bodies.
D. WHICH FIRMS DO ESTABLISH COMPLIANCE COMMITTEES?
Having explored reasons why firms might choose to establish a board compliance committee, we are now in a position to
test these in our data. In this subpart, we present multivariate

208. See, e.g., Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and Outside
Directors’ Protection, 46 J. LEGAL STUDS. 129 (2017) (suggesting that interlocking directors contribute to outside directors’ knowledge and bargaining power
in restoring directors’ indemnification protection); John M. Bizjak et al., Option
Backdating and Board Interlocks, 22 REV. FIN. STUDS. 4821, 4838 (2009) (showing that interlocking directors were an important conduit contributing to the
spread of backdating of option grants); Gerald F. David, Agents Without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill Through the Intracorporate Network, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 583 (1991) (showing that poison pill adoptions increase with interlocking directors); Erik Devos et al., Are Interlocked Directors Effective
Monitors?, 38 FIN. MGMT. 861 (2009) (documenting that the presence of interlocked directors is associated with the reduced sensitivity of CEO turnover to
firm performance); id. at 862 (“A more recent stream in this line of research
suggests that the presence of interlocked directors and connected boards may
compromise the effectiveness of board monitoring, especially with respect to the
setting of compensation of CEOs.”); Kevin F. Hallock, Reciprocally Interlocking
Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation, 32 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 331, 338 (1997) (suggesting that firms whose CEOs are reciprocally
interlocked by serving on each other’s boards pay their CEOs substantially
higher because these CEOs may have both the incentive and the opportunity to
raise each other’s pay); Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards,
51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 811 (2005) (“Unless executives have an informational advantage that allows them to develop superior forecasts regarding the future
market movements that drive these predicted returns, the results suggest that
the official grant date must have been set retroactively.”); Christine Shropshire,
The Role of the Interlocking Director and Board Receptivity in the Diffusion of
Practices, 35 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 246, 252–53 (2010) (theoretically proposing
that “the likelihood of knowledge transfer increases if the interlocking director
serves on the relevant board committee at the focal firm”).
209. See generally David, supra note 208 (discussing the theories of the poison pill and its use by management teams).
210. See generally Hallock, supra note 208 (explaining the concept of CEO
interlocks and how they can lead to higher compensation).
211. See Bizjak et al., supra note 208.
212. See Barzuza & Curtis, supra note 208.
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regression results that shed light on these hypotheses. Our results show that companies are more likely to adopt compliance
committees if they have been targets of prosecution, and/or if one
of their board members has outside experience of the use of compliance committees. However, the overall level of adoption of
compliance committees among public companies is still extremely low: less than 5%.
1. Regression Specification: Main Variables of Interest
We first identify variables that reflect, or at least proxy for,
the presence of the factors we described in Part II.C as affecting
firms’ choices whether or not to establish a board compliance
committee. Our variable DOJ Enforcement seeks to capture the
effect of prosecution. It is a dummy (binary) variable taking the
value 1 if the firm was on the receiving end of a DOJ enforcement
action in the previous three years, resulting in a DPA, a plea
agreement, or a conviction. Turning to the risk, or likelihood of
prosecution, we use a variable DOJ Exposure, which measures
the prosecution rate of peer companies in the same industry over
the period 2004–2017, based on Duke/UVA Corporate Prosecution Registry data). We also use industry dummy variables,
which allow us to explore the effect of being in a regulated industry.
To explore relationships with board structure, we include
variables Board Size—that is, the total number of board members; NonExecDir. Ratio—the proportion of the board that is
comprised of directors who are not also executives—and Aud.
Cttee. Ratio—namely, the ratio of directors sitting on the Audit
committee to the entire board membership. Finally, our variable
CC Interlock indicates whether any of the company’s board members also sits on the board of another company with a CC.213 This
captures outside experience with CC implementation.

213. We constructed this variable by first identifying in each sample year all
“interlocking” directors in our data concurrently serving on two or more boards,
of which at least one had adopted a compliance committee. We then converted
this director-level data into the company-level dummy variable CC Interlock by
giving a value of 1 to a company that has at least one interlocking director concurrently sitting on the board of another company with a compliance committee
for any given year.
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Table 6 reports logit regression results for our panel of U.S.
public firms during the period 2004–2017.214 The dependent variable, Compliance Committee, is a dummy (binary) variable taking the value 1 if a firm adopts a compliance committee in a particular year. We take “compliance committee” adoption for these
purposes to include stand-alone compliance committees, risk and
compliance committees, and audit and compliance committees,215 although we have seen in Figure 2 that the lion’s share
of this activity is stand-alone compliance committees. Model (1)
shows relationships between each variable and CC adoption
when all variables of interest are included. Models (2)–(4) each
include only one of three main variables of interest (DOJ Enforcement, DOJ Exposure, and CC Interlock) to consider
whether the results are robust to the exclusion of the other two
variables.

214. We use a logit regression because the dependent variable in this case is
binary. The coefficients report marginal effects.
215. See supra Part II.B.1.
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Table 6. Determinants of Compliance Committee Adoptions
Independent
Variables

DOJ Enforcement

(1)
Board
Compliance
Committee

Dependent
(2)
Board
Compliance
Committee

Variable
(3)
Board
Compliance
Committee

(4)
Board
Compliance
Committee

0.839***
(0.281)
3.424
(7.805)
0.463***
(0.130)
-0.00271
(0.0138)
0.302
(0.623)
0.0830***
(0.0300)
1.129**
(0.453)
1.174
(0.905)
-0.0885
(0.168)
0.163***
(0.0492)
0.767*
(0.410)
0.0101
(0.0455)

-0.00364
(0.0138)
0.178
(0.615)
0.0875***
(0.0295)
1.127**
(0.457)
1.338
(0.907)
-0.0666
(0.169)
0.194***
(0.0485)
0.715*
(0.413)
0.0146
(0.0451)

-0.00385
(0.0138)
0.146
(0.615)
0.0884***
(0.0295)
1.160**
(0.456)
1.357
(0.909)
-0.0746
(0.168)
0.211***
(0.0479)
0.721*
(0.416)
0.0104
(0.0452)

0.465***
(0.129)
-0.00291
(0.0138)
0.270
(0.623)
0.0839***
(0.0300)
1.162**
(0.453)
1.193
(0.907)
-0.0950
(0.168)
0.179***
(0.0486)
0.774*
(0.413)
0.00562
(0.0457)

Year FE
Industry FE

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Observations
Pseudo R2

41,261
0.1291

41,261
0.1252

41,261
0.1232

41,261
0.1271

DOJ Exposure
CC Interlock
Ave. Dir. Age
Male Board
Board Size
Aud. Cttee. Ratio
NonExecDir. Ratio
Delaware Inc.
Firm Size
RoA(t-1)
Tobin’s Q(t-1)

0.857***
(0.282)
9.099
(7.782)

Note: Logit models of the likelihood that a firm will have a Compliance
Committee in a particular year. Compliance Committee includes standalone compliance committees, risk and compliance committees, and audit and compliance committees; DOJ Enforcement is a dummy for
whether the firm has been the subject of a DPA or plea agreement in
the previous 3 years; DOJ Exposure is the rate of prosecution in the
same industry during the previous three years; CC Interlock is a
dummy for whether any board member concurrently sits on the board
of another company with a Compliance Committee; Ave. Dir. Age is average age of board members; Male Board is the ratio of male board
members; Board Size is total number of board members; Aud. Cttee.
Ratio is the ratio of Audit committee members to entire board members; NonExecDir. Ratio is the ratio of non-executive board members to
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entire board members; Delaware Inc. is a dummy for Delaware incorporation; Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets;
RoA(t-1) is the firm’s Return on Assets in the previous year; Tobin’s
Q (t-1) is the firm’s market to book ratio in the previous year. Values in
RoA, Tobin’s Q, and Total Assets are winsorized at one percent in both
tails. All models have year and industry fixed effects (using FamaFrench 48 industry classification). Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).

2. Control Variables
In all specifications, we include year and industry fixed effects. We also include a number of additional covariates (control
variables) that might be expected to affect CC adoption. First,
the size of the firm as captured by Total Assets. There is a fixed
cost associated with CC establishment, and the size of compliance investments are likely to be increasing with the size of the
firm. Thus, we would expect firm size to be correlated with CC
adoption, which in fact it is in all our regression specifications.
Second, firm prior performance, as captured by RoA (return on
assets) and Tobin’s Q,216 in each case lagged by one year.217 Neither appears to have any significant relationship with CC adoption. We also include a dummy variable for whether the firm is
incorporated in Delaware, because prior literature establishes
that due to Delaware’s pre-eminence as a jurisdiction of choice
for public companies, firms incorporated there are different in
many respects from firms that choose to remain incorporated in
their home states.218 We find no significant effect of Delaware
incorporation on CC adoption.
Finally, we include two variables relating to board characteristics: Male Board and Ave. Dir. Age in case gender diversity

216. “Tobin’s Q” is here taken to be the ratio of a firm’s market value to the
book value of its assets, a commonly used proxy for firm performance. For a
discussion of the derivation of this measure, its common use, and its limitations,
see Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s Q, VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019).
217. “Lagging” the variable by one year means that when considering values
of variables from year x, the value of the lagged variable that is included is for
year x – 1.
218. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 605, 607 (2012); Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 383–89 (2003); Kate Litvak,
How Much Can We Learn by Regressing Corporate Characteristics Against the
State of Incorporation?, J.L. FIN. & ACCT. (forthcoming 2019).
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or average age of directors affects openness to CC adoption. The
coefficient for these variables is not statistically significant.
3. Discussion of Results
We now turn to our main results of interest. The variable
DOJ Enforcement is positive and strongly statistically significant (at the 99% level) both with and without influence of the
other two variables of interest as shown in specifications (1) and
(2) respectively. This means that companies that have faced DOJ
enforcement during the previous three years are much more
likely to adopt CCs at the board level. This suggests that the increased investment in compliance programs commonly demanded in DPAs and plea agreements (reviewed in Part II.C.1)
is associated with the adoption of CCs by these firms. Because
we know that the DPAs and plea agreements almost never specifically mandate the creation of a CC,219 this implies that these
firms establish CCs to enhance the firm’s overall compliance capacity in light of the compliance investments that are otherwise
required.
What about risk of prosecution? Although the coefficients for
DOJ Exposure have the expected sign (positive), it is notable
that neither of them is anywhere near statistically significant.
This means that the industry risk of prosecution does not influence the likelihood of CC adoption by companies in that industry. As we use industry fixed effects, we can also explore whether
there is a greater pattern of CC use in regulated industries. As
discussed in Part II.C.1, firms in regulated industries—such as
healthcare, pharmaceuticals, and petroleum and natural gas—
may face higher expectations and scrutiny regarding compliance
activity. However, apart from healthcare,220 the coefficients for
these three industry dummies (unreported) are not significant.
We also find that director interlocks may provide a mechanism for diffusion of information about CCs. The coefficients for
CC Interlock are positive and strongly statistically significant (at
the 99% level) with or without the influence of DOJ Enforcement
and DOJ Exposure, as shown in models (1) and (4). That is,
boards with a director who has outside experience of CCs are
much more likely to adopt a CC. This suggests that “learning
219. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
220. The coefficients for the healthcare industry dummy are positive and
significant at the 99% level in all models.
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effects” may be present in CC adoption: boards learn from the
experience of their members about the way in which CCs function.
Turning to board capacity, the variable Board Size has a
positive coefficient in all the regression models and is statistically significant at the 95% level in all models. This result is consistent with the idea that CC adoption may be made easier by
the presence of more directors, which increases the capacity of
the board to staff a compliance committee. This is independent
of the size of the audit committee, which we capture separately
through Aud. Cttee. Ratio. The coefficient on Aud. Cttee. Ratio is
positive and statistically significant (at the 95% level) in all specifications.221 In an unreported test, we saw that adoption of a CC
was not associated with an increase in board size. This suggests
that firms with greater board capacity have a stronger predisposition to set up a CC.
Finally, there appears to be a strong firm size effect in CC
adoption. The coefficient for Firm Size is positive and strongly
statistically significant (at the 99% level) in all specifications.
That this is significant, independent of board size, suggests that
the channel through which firm size is related to CC adoption is
not simply that larger firms have larger boards. Rather, it is
plausibly driven by larger firms having larger-scale compliance
endeavors, which in turn are more likely to justify board oversight through a CC.
Table 7 shows that the results for DOJ Enforcement, DOJ
Exposure, CC Interlock, and Firm Size remain very similar when
we measure the relationship between independent variables we
used in Table 6 and the adoption of “stand-alone” CCs, which
excludes CCs combined with either audit or risk committees.
However, the results for Board Size and Aud. Cttee. Ratio are
not statistically significant.

221. This latter result may be due to the inclusion in the dependent variable
of cases where firms rebrand their audit committee as “Audit and Compliance,”
which would be expected to be associated with a larger AC.
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Table 7. Determinants of Stand-alone Compliance
Committee Adoptions
Independent Variables

DOJ Enforcement

(1)
Stand-alone
Compliance Committee

Dependent
(2)
Stand-alone
Compliance Committee

Variable
(3)
Stand-alone
Compliance Committee

(4)
Stand-alone
Compliance Committee

1.010***
(0.300)
4.870
(10.000)
0.561***
(0.147)
0.0112
(0.0176)
0.254
(0.727)
0.0160
(0.0365)
0.282
(0.569)
0.938
(1.098)
-0.0714
(0.201)
0.235***
(0.0578)
0.732
(0.475)
0.0147
(0.0505)

1.026***
(0.305)

0.00990
(0.0174)
0.0849
(0.714)
0.0248
(0.0359)
0.286
(0.563)
1.199
(1.094)
-0.0434
(0.203)
0.270***
(0.0572)
0.659
(0.479)
0.0194
(0.0504)

0.00937
(0.0174)
0.0538
(0.715)
0.0278
(0.0357)
0.338
(0.564)
1.215
(1.097)
-0.0583
(0.201)
0.295***
(0.0559)
0.663
(0.483)
0.0133
(0.0506)

0.561***
(0.145)
0.0106
(0.0176)
0.221
(0.729)
0.0190
(0.0364)
0.332
(0.571)
0.957
(1.102)
-0.0833
(0.200)
0.259***
(0.0565)
0.737
(0.480)
0.00816
(0.0508)

Year FE
Industry FE

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Observations
Pseudo R2

41,261
0.1554

41,261
0.1496

41,261
0.1462

41,261
0.1519

DOJ Exposure
CC Interlock
Ave. Dir. Age
Male Board
Board Size
Aud. Cttee. Ratio
NonExecDir. Ratio
Delaware Inc.
Firm Size
RoA(t-1)
Tobin’s Q(t-1)

12.85
(9.999)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Logit models of the likelihood that a firm will have a stand-alone
compliance committee in a particular year. Stand-alone Compliance
Committee solely counts stand-alone compliance committees, excluding
compliance committees combined with audit committees or risk committees. DOJ Enforcement is a dummy for whether the firm has been
the subject of a DPA or plea agreement in the previous three years;
DOJ Exposure is the rate of prosecution in the same industry during
the previous three years; CC Interlock is a dummy for whether any
board member concurrently sits on the board of another company with
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a Compliance Committee; Ave. Dir. Age is average age of board members; Male Board is the ratio of male board members; Board Size is
total number of board members; Aud. Cttee. Ratio is the ratio of Audit
committee members to entire board members; NonExecDir. Ratio is the
ratio of non-executive board members to entire board members; Delaware Inc. is a dummy for Delaware incorporation; Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets; RoA(t-1) is the firm’s Return on
Assets in the previous year; Tobin’s Q(t-1) is the firm’s market to book
ratio in the previous year. Values in RoA, Tobin’s Q, and Total Assets
are winsorized at one percent in both tails. All models have year and
industry fixed effects (using Fama-French 48 industry classification).
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).

Our results show that companies are more likely to adopt
compliance committees if they have been targets of prosecution
and if one of their board members has outside experience with
using a CC. However, there is surprisingly little evidence that
companies for which compliance investment is likely to be more
valuable—in regulated industries or industries facing increased
levels of prosecution activity—are likely to adopt CCs. More fundamentally, the overall level of adoption of compliance committees among public companies is still extremely low: less than 5%.
This provokes a normative enquiry: Does it matter that the use
of CCs is so infrequent? And if so, what should policymakers and
boards do about it? We turn to these questions in Part III.
III. RETHINKING BOARD COMPLIANCE
A. WHY ARE COMPLIANCE COMMITTEES NOT MORE COMMON?
In the wake of corporate scandals, many have asked how to
create accountability within corporations. There is, as Samuel
Buell has described, a responsibility gap, where in the largest
corporations, the CEOs and high-level officers may not have
been aware of misconduct, but they also may have presided over
a non-compliance system in which strong incentives existed to
profit from misconduct.222 Criminal prosecutions have not been
effective at targeting higher-level officers, in part because it is
often quite difficult to show that they were aware of misconduct;

222. See generally Samuel Buell, The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime,
12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 471 (2018) (discussing the concept of the responsibility gap).
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indeed they may have been unaware.223 Yet, the public has clamored for accountability, including through criminal convictions.224 Such convictions might lead to severe punishment for
misconduct with grave social consequences, but it does not prevent future compliance breakdowns.
One way to accomplish those forward-looking goals is to require corporations to create better compliance programs. However, as discussed, little consensus exists regarding what sort of
compliance works or what type of oversight boards should provide over compliance. Enforcers, whether regulators or prosecutors, are not able to easily ensure day-to-day oversight over compliance reforms, although they have sometimes attempted to do
so with the use of independent corporate monitors.225 Instead, it
often lies to the board to ensure that compliance reforms are in
place.226 That is why creation of a compliance oversight function
at the board level has been understood as relevant to the board’s
oversight role and as a way for the compliance function to be elevated in importance and relatively more autonomous from
management.227
Of course, the needs of individual companies vary. A central
message of corporate governance research is that there are few
general truths about what works best in board structure—much
of the answer depends on the characteristics of the individual
firm.228 Consistent with this, we see that firm-level attributes
predict CC adoption. Our concern here is not with firm-level variation, but the low aggregate level of adoption. In Part I.C, we
223. See Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 265, 268–71 (2014).
224. See Jean Eaglesham & Anupreeta Das, Wall Street Crime: 7 Years, 156
Cases and Few Convictions, WALL STREET J. (May 27, 2016), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-crime-7-years-156-cases-and-few-convictions
-1464217378 [https://perma.cc/Y2T6-LY5F]; Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
(Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.theregreview.org/2014/01/13/rakoff-no-high-level
-prosecutions/ [https://perma.cc/5RE2-TPTC].
225. See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate
Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1717–19 (2007).
226. See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 30.
227. See Lipton et al., supra note 112 (noting the importance of a strong “tone
at the top” on compliance from the board).
228. See, e.g., Renée B. Adams et al., The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LIT. 58
(2010).
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characterized the adoption of a compliance committee as not a
matter of “window dressing” for a board, but as having real costs
and benefits. Our empirical results are consistent with this
framing. Firms are (i) more likely to adopt CCs upon making increased investment in compliance, and (ii) constraints on board
capacity to staff a CC make their adoption less likely. Against
this background, we now consider two further possible interpretations of our results.
1. Do Companies Invest Enough in Compliance?
Our results about the link between prosecution and CC
adoption229 suggest that compliance committees are associated
with greater underlying investments in compliance. We know
from the text of DPAs and plea agreements that these CCs are
not created because prosecutors demand them; 230 rather it
seems most likely that companies choose to create them to oversee the heightened compliance programs that we also know—
from the text of the agreements—that prosecutors do demand.231
One plausible explanation for the low aggregate uptake of
compliance committees is therefore that companies generally do
not make sufficient compliance investments to justify a new committee devoted to their oversight. Of course, given that expenditure on compliance is typically not disclosed, this can only be
conjecture. And whether it is problematic or not requires us to
identify a baseline level of “desirable” compliance investment.
While little is known about the utility of corporate compliance programs in reducing underlying levels of misconduct, it is
clear that the implementation of an effective compliance program is taken into account by prosecutors and other enforcement
agencies in reducing penalties ex post for firms that have done
so.232 So, from the firm’s point of view, compliance programs can
be a worthwhile investment simply to reduce expected enforcement costs. Were firms responding to this incentive, we would
expect to see more extensive compliance programs in regulated
industries, and in industries facing increased prosecution rates.

229.
230.
231.
232.

Supra Parts II.C.1, II.D.3.
Supra Part II.B.
Supra Part II.B.
Supra Part I.A.
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Yet we find little, if any, evidence for either of these.233 A possible explanation is that firms are underinvesting in compliance,
relative to what would minimize their expected exposures.
Why might firms do this? If compliance investment is not
disclosed, investors will find it difficult to take into account the
effects such a program will have on expected enforcement
costs. 234 Moreover—as discussed above—disclosing extensive
compliance investment is unlikely to be appealing, because this
will reveal to investors the extent of the expected enforcement
costs to which compliance responds.235
2. Do Boards Have Sufficient Capacity?
A complementary explanation, which is also consistent with
our results, is that limits on board members’ time capacity may
constrain their engagement in compliance oversight in most
companies.
Two parts of our results are relevant to this. First, experience with CC use by one or more board members increases the
likelihood that a company will adopt a CC. This is consistent
with the existence of learning costs—the time and resources
taken for board members to inform themselves of new developments. As a result, boards may plausibly be unaware of the benefits of compliance committees unless these are relayed to them
by a colleague with experience. This matches with a factor emphasized by our interviewees—that board members’ time is
tightly constrained and they are highly focused in their activities. However, the fact that the effect of such experience is
strongly positive suggests boards who do learn about CCs find
them worthwhile to adopt. In turn, this implies that boards’ tight
focus may come at the price of learning about potentially beneficial innovations in governance.
A second relevant aspect of our results is the linkage we report in Table 6 between board size, the proportion of board participation in the AC, and CC adoption.236 While these correlations, by themselves, do not suggest any particular causal

233. Supra Part II.D.3.
234. This discussion draws on a fuller argument set out by three of us elsewhere. See Armour et al., supra note 31.
235. Id. at 23–24.
236. Supra Part II.D.3.
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relationship, we think they are suggestive, in light of the capacity constraints of board members who might be candidates for
service on a CC. As is well-known, widely-accepted norms of
“good governance” prescribe that at least a majority of a public
company’s board should be independent. 237 Moreover, public
companies are required to establish an AC staffed exclusively by
independent directors.238 To be independent, one cannot be an
employee of the company.239 This means that independent directorships must necessarily be part-time positions. Boards (and
board committees) meet several times a year. At each relevant
meeting, board members will spend a day or so preparing for the
meeting by reading the materials. But outside these periods, independent directors will not be engaging with the company’s affairs. To do more might challenge their status as non-employees,
and hence their independence.
At the same time, an influential school of thought emphasizes the performance benefits of “smaller boards.”240 In theory,
optimal board size depends on a trade-off between various relevant factors, such as range of expertise (suggesting more members) and cohesiveness (suggesting fewer members).241 A body of
practitioner literature focuses on the results of academic studies
and practitioner surveys that report performance benefits associated with boards of around ten to twelve members.242 While
these results are averages that describe practice, in the hands of
some corporate governance advisors they can easily acquire normative significance as “rules of thumb” that then constrain practice going forward.243

237. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., NYSE LISTED CO. MANUAL § 303A.01
(2009) (“Listed companies must have a majority of independent directors.”).
238. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012)).
239. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., supra note 237, § 303A.02(b)(i) (“[A] director is
not independent if . . . [t]he director is, or has been within the last three years,
an employee of the listed company . . . .”).
240. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
241. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
242. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
243. AUSTL. INST. OF CO. DIRS., NUMBER OF DIRECTORS—BOARD SIZE 2,
http://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/~/media/cd2/resources/director-resources/
director-tools/pdf/05446-3-1-mem-director-tools-gr-number-of-directors_a4-web
.ashx [https://perma.cc/ELQ2-9VYF] (providing a “rule of thumb” suggesting 8–
12 directors for a large Australian listed company); see, e.g., Stephen Bain-

1260

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1191

Putting these pieces together, board independence and audit committee requirements coupled with constraints—or even
just some drag—on board size can easily add up to very tight
limits on a board aggregate time budget. This, in turn, could constrain capacity to adopt a compliance committee.
B. ENCOURAGING BOARD COMPLIANCE?
One implication suggested by our empirical inquiry is the
potential gap between the socially optimal and privately optimal
board size and capacity. Board size, as we have observed, is heavily influenced by academic studies (which have become conventional wisdom) that indicate that smaller boards are associated
with higher stock prices.244 For many companies, a CC would be
costly from a shareholder point of view because of the diversion
of constrained director attention away from business performance issues—unless the company had previously been targeted
as a violator, which is the pattern we observe. 245 Yet greater
compliance oversight at the board-level is likely to reduce the
incidence of law violations by the firm.246 This is an implication
of our study of CC charters, which shows the sharper focus and
additional resources that compliance committees bring to compliance oversight.247 It is highly unlikely that our system of criminal and administrative enforcement has achieved the socially
bridge, Board Size: Is There an Optimum?, STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE’S J.L., RELIGION, POL. & CULTURE (May 8, 2009), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2009/05/board-size-is-there-an-optimum.html [https://
perma.cc/22FC-9GRJ] (surveying academic literature and concluding that “[a]
Korn/Ferry survey of corporate directors found: ‘According to respondents, the
optimal board size is two inside directors and eight outside.’ Sounds about right
to me.”); Nicholas J. Price, Best Practices: Board Size and Corporate Governance, DILIGENT INSIGHTS (Sept. 25, 2017), https://diligent.com/blog/board-size
-corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/BX3Z-ZB5V] (discussing prior studies
and noting that “less is more”); Robert Reiss, The 10 Best Practices for an Effective Board, FORBES (Nov. 25, 2015, 8:47 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
robertreiss/2015/11/25/the-10-best-practices-for-an-effectiveboard/
#cb8f00f413b9 [https://perma.cc/6YX3-9RGC] (“The best group of an averagesized American public company would be nine to twelve board members.”). The
central academic paper is David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Smaller Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185 passim (1996) (finding inverse correlation between board size and firm value).
244. Supra Part III.A.2.
245. See supra Part II.
246. See supra Part II.
247. See supra Part II.
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optimal level of corporate compliance. In short, pursuit of the
privately optimal board size and structure may well have generated a board capacity constraint that results in a socially-suboptimal adoption of compliance committees.
Our empirical study shows that ninety-four percent of public
companies still do not have compliance committees.248 Thus far
public authorities have not mandated compliance committees except in five corporate prosecutions, and occasionally in other areas of civil enforcement.249 In general, the enforcers mandate increased compliance but have not taken the next corporate
governance step.250 In this section we explore three mechanisms
to close the gap between the socially optimal and privately optimal level of board compliance oversight: first, an illustrative set
of direct federal regulatory interventions; second, corporate governance innovations to expand board capacity; and third, toughening of the state corporate law director liability standard for
failure of compliance oversight.251
1. Regulatory Interventions To Strengthen Board Compliance
Regulators could adopt a more directive role in requiring, or
at least promoting, board responsibility for compliance. We have
described a real reluctance among enforcers to require that
boards create compliance committees.252 We have also described
that more companies do create such committees when, following
an enforcement action, prosecutors more strongly signal, if not
require, that boards oversee compliance using a committeestructure.253 An enforcement strategy, however, sends messages
primarily to companies facing consequences for violations and
only secondarily to others in industry that observe enforcement
outcomes.254 Indeed, the lack of relationship between compliance
committee adoption and exposure to DOJ enforcement (as proxied by industry prosecution rates) suggests that these secondary

248. Supra Part II.A.3.
249. The OCC has sometimes required creation of board compliance committees as well. OCC Orders Bank to Refund Up to $14 Million, 60 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 223 (2006).
250. See supra Part I.B.3.
251. See infra Part III.B.1.
252. See supra Part II.C.1.
253. See supra Part II.D.
254. See supra Part II.D.
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messages are not getting through. It is more challenging for enforcers to send positive messages regarding best practices, as opposed to practices that result in enforcement and sanctions.
What would a more directive regulatory regime look like?
One option—surely overkill—would simply be to require all public company boards to have a compliance committee. A more tailored version would be to require CCs for companies in industries where the importance and density of federal regulation give
rise to the greatest under-compliance concerns. For example,
three industries where the public interest in compliance is especially high are: health care, in light of the federal economic support via Medicare and Medicaid; pharmaceuticals, in light of extensive federal standard setting and monitoring; and financial
services, in light of the important consumer protection issues as
well as the systemic stability concerns. 255 A further measure
would be for a regulator not only to require a CC but also establish standards of CC “best practice.” This would reduce the risk
that CC activity was mostly window-dressing.256
Another regulatory approach would look to augmenting the
board’s compliance capacity, either as a general matter or for
targeted industries. This approach has been followed in some
settlement agreements, which require the appointment of a
“board compliance expert” who participates in all board meetings
with a compliance presentation. 257 This is an outsider to the
board with extensive compliance expertise who may be given
prior notice of the compliance presentation and the opportunity

255. See supra note 16.
256. For example, the Corporate Integrity Agreement entered by Tenet
Health Care, in a False Claims Act case, not only required that the chief compliance officer report directly to the board, but that the compliance committee
of the board conduct a review of the effectiveness of the compliance program.
See Press Release, Office of Inspector General, OIG Executes Tenet Corporate
Integrity Agreement Unprecedented Provisions Include Board of Directors Review (Sept. 28, 2006), https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/press/Tenet%20CIA%
20press%20release.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW5E-EKAV].
257. Corporate Integrity Agreement, Office of the Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services & Tuomey D/B/A Tuomey
Healthcare System, at 1, 27 (2015) [hereinafter Corporate Integrity Agreement]; see also Meghana Joshi, DOJ and OIG Increasing Focus on Personal Executive and Board Accountability: In Light of Recent Changes, Compliance Officers Should Incorporate a Number of Guidelines into Their Everyday Practice,
18 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 23, 25 (2016).
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to insist on deeper examination if dissatisfied.258 Alternatively,
the regulator could require as part of its “qualification” requirements that the board have at least one director who would count
as a “compliance expert” regarding the regulatory regime to
which the company is subject. 259 The combination of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and stock exchange listing requirements
achieved a similar objective regarding financial expertise of audit committee members.260
An approach that would provide more flexibility to boards
would be for the primary regulator to require certifications from
boards regarding their compliance oversight. Some agencies
have followed this approach in resolving enforcement actions
with non-complying companies.261 In the health care context, for
example, the Department of Health and Human Services, Office
of Inspector General issued guidance in 2015 to corporate boards
on health care compliance, highlighting that “every Board is responsible for ensuring that its organization complies with relevant Federal, State, and local laws.”262 There was a perception
that boards were “inclined to address only global issues and view
matters such as compliance as technical ‘day-to-day’ issues,
which are the province of trained staff.”263 For that reason, some
regulators have intensified their focus on the responsibility of
directors.264 They have emphasized the role of the board in ensuring ongoing risk assessment and auditing as well as regular
“executive sessions” with members of the compliance team.265

258. Corporate Integrity Agreement, supra note 257, at 7–8.
259. Joshi, supra note 257, at 25.
260. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407, 116 Stat. 746
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012)); see also N.Y STOCK EXCH., INC., supra note
237, § 303A.06–07; NASDAQ LISTING RULE § 5605(c) (2009).
261. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR HEALTH
CARE GOVERNING BOARDS ON COMPLIANCE OVERSIGHT 16 (2015).
262. Id.
263. Joseph T. Kelley III, Board Governance, Compliance, and Behavioral
Health, HEALTH CARE L. ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE, 2015 WL 9182494, at
*1 (2016).
264. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. ET AL., THE HEALTH CARE DIRECTOR’S
COMPLIANCE DUTIES: A CONTINUED FOCUS OF ATTENTION AND ENFORCEMENT
(2011).
265. Kelley, supra note 263, at *5–6.
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Boards may have taken heed of this.266 Agreements in the
health care context often include “a resolution, signed by each
member of the Board summarizing its review and oversight of
[the center’s] compliance with Federal health care program requirements and the obligations of this CIA [Corporate Integrity
Agreement].”267 These agreements have included certifications
of compliance, that the board has made a “reasonable inquiry”
into compliance, including a “Compliance Review,” and that
based on this, the board has concluded that the company has an
“effective compliance” regime.268 Thus, the board’s oversight responsibilities are formally recognized and bolstered but without
specifying a structure for that oversight. Such certifications
could be mandated for all companies in certain regulated industries, or by all public companies and not just ones found to engage in violations.
2. Expanding Board Capacity Through Corporate Governance
Innovation
There are three readily identifiable corporate governance innovations that would expand board capacity. The first is to increase board size with an eye towards increasing compliance
committee adoptions. Increasing board size may stimulate a virtuous circle in the case of compliance committees: increased
board capacity lowers the cost of CC adoption (because there is
less trade-off with board attention to core business matters); lowering the cost reduces the adverse signal of CC adoption; in turn,
more CCs further reduce the adverse signal. This could be the
approach of asset managers and other institutional investors
who want to pursue (and to be seen pursuing) “stewardship”

266. Deann M. Baker, Key Methods to Develop and Mature Your Compliance
Program, 10 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 37, 37 (2008).
267. Jeremy Sternberg, HHS-OIG Corporate Integrity Agreements Are Now
Aiming at Corporate Directors and Executives, JDSUPRA (Oct. 31, 2013), http://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/hhs-oig-corporate-integrity-agreements-a-11456/
[https://perma.cc/4S9P-6MZX]; see, e.g., Corporate Integrity Agreement Between The Office of Inspector General of the Dept. of Health and Human Serv.
& Hutchinson Regional Med. Ctr. (2013).
268. Kathleen McDermott & Arianne Callender, Compliance Certifications
and the Era of Accountability—A Forecast to Debate, 5 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L.
158, 174–75 (2012).
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agendas.269 Such investors commonly hold fully-diversified portfolios.270 Compliance failures, meaning, violations of law, commonly result in negative externalities felt elsewhere in the portfolio. 271 One does not need to believe that all regulation is
optimal to think that compliance failures will on average result
in social welfare losses that the diversified shareholder would
prefer to avoid.
For the firm that adopts a CC, a further strengthening of
compliance oversight would come through explicit authorization
in the committee charter to launch investigations and retain outside experts at its discretion. For example, the HCA Healthcare
committee charter states that the committee “may retain any independent counsel, experts or advisors (accounting, financial or
otherwise) that the Committee believes to be necessary or appropriate.”272 It also states that the “Committee may conduct special reviews or investigations as it may deem necessary or appropriate to fulfill its responsibilities.”273
A second possibility is the addition of a compliance expert as
a director (which is easier if the board is expanded)274 or adopting through self-help the regulatory intervention described
above. This proposal is to enlist a compliance expert to sit with
the board during presentations of compliance-related matters, in
observer/monitor status. This outsider would be more effective if
he/she has a prior briefing on the compliance presentation and
the opportunity to insist on deeper examination if he/she is dissatisfied. For example, Standard Chartered Bank, an international bank headquartered in the UK, established a Board Financial Crime Risk Committee in 2014, comprised of five
independent directors and three external advisors with expertise
and experience in combating financial crime.275
269. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: 2018
ANNUAL REPORT (2018).
270. Armour et al., supra note 31, at 54.
271. Id.
272. HCA HEALTHCARE INC., AUDIT AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE CHARTER
2 (2018), https://investor.hcahealthcare.com/sites/hcahealthcare.investorhq
.businesswire.com/files/doc_library/file/HCA_-_Audit_and_Compliance_
Committee_Charter_Jan_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8CA-ZZWE].
273. Id. at 8.
274. See Roy Snell, It’s Time to Get Serious About Board Expertise, 13 J.
HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 3 passim (2011).
275. Press Release, Standard Chartered, Standard Chartered Forms Board
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A third possibility is to vary the board model to add an outside director who is specifically empowered to focus on the company’s compliance issues. Such a director would be sufficiently
resourced to serve as an independent monitor of the company’s
own compliance efforts. The required time and expertise would
call for higher compensation levels than the typical part-time director of the current board model. This suggestion echoes a wellknown strand in the corporate governance literature, which
questions the efficacy of part-time boards and looks for a new
category of director. 276 One important question is whether
higher director pay would compromise director independence,
because the director with a sweet deal would have a special reason to avoid antagonizing the CEO. The increasingly important
role of the independent nominating-governance committee in
identifying director candidates and vetting the director performance should offer some protection on this dimension.277 Service
in this role might be time-limited and directors could well seek a
reputation for vigorous compliance oversight.
While it appears that tools are at hand to increase board capacity to facilitate engagement with compliance, a question remains whether boards have sufficient incentives to wish to do so.
These incentives are clearly affected by their corporate law duties, to which we now turn.

Financial Crime Risk Committee (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.sc.com/en/media/
press-release/standard-chartered-forms-board-financial-crime-risk-committee/
[https://perma.cc/7W3T-SK9R].
276. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991).
More recently Professors Gilson and Gordon have proposed an optional board
model in which companies could chose to add “empowered directors” who would
have much deeper engagement with the firm and who would be given additional
resources and access (and compensation). The focus of their concern has been
the firm’s strategy and operational performance, but the model could be focused
on compliance oversight for firms where compliance failures are a major business risk. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Board 3.0 – An Introduction,
74 BUS. LAW. 351 (2019).
277. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., NYSE LISTED CO. MANUAL § 303A.04
(2009) (requiring Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee consisting
solely of independent directors and tasked with identifying qualified individuals
to become board members).
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3. Toughening Director Liability Standards Under State
Corporate Law
A distinctly different direction would be for the Delaware
courts to increase the prospect of director liability for breach of
fiduciary duty as respects compliance oversight failures. Under
the Caremark standard, boards’ duties to engage in good faith
oversight have two aspects: a general (and on-going) duty to ensure that there is a system of compliance in place, and a specific
and conditional obligation to respond in good faith to any “red
flags” that this system should subsequently bring up. 278 A
breach of duty can be triggered only by a failure of oversight so
comprehensive as to call into question the board’s good faith.279
The practical question for boards is the extent to which they
are required by their duties to act in relation to monitoring. The
answer, at least as regards ensuring there is a system of oversight in place, is that their actual obligation is minimal. In Chancellor Allen’s view, the Caremark duty would only be violated by
“a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists.”280 Or, as the Delaware
Supreme Court subsequently put it in Stone v. Ritter, 281 that
“the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls.”
This boils down to a continuing monitoring obligation that
is essentially binary: either there is no effort at all, or there is
some effort. Any level of positive effort greater than zero seems
to suffice for directors to meet their fiduciary obligations in this
context. Consider the following account of the sorts of board-level
failures that would be necessary to ground a claim for liability:282

278. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch.
1996).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
282. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2003); see also
David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Account v. Citigroup, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1449-N,
2006 WL 391931, at *1, *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2006).
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[C]ontentions that the company lacked an audit committee, that the
company had an audit committee that met only sporadically and devoted patently inadequate time to its work, or that the audit committee
had clear notice of serious accounting irregularities and simply chose
to ignore them or, even worse, to encourage their continuation. 283

The recent case of Horman v. Abney, concerning allegations
of Caremark violations by the board of UPS in relation to the
transportation of illegal tobacco products, provides an illustrative example.284 The fact that the plaintiffs conceded that the
board had established an audit committee whose responsibilities
included “oversight of ‘the Company’s compliance with legal and
regulatory requirements’” and that the board was “provided updates about legal compliance through reports from the UPS Legal Department” was fatal to their claim that the board had
failed to implement any reporting or compliance systems.285 By
simply establishing these structures, the board had met their
Caremark obligations.286
Of course, if the board actually came to be aware of any compliance failures, then it will be much easier to argue that they
acted in good faith if they did not follow them up vigorously.287
Yet this gives board members a reason to prefer a less vigorous
approach to continuing monitoring and oversight, on the basis
that this will make it less likely that any compliance failure will
ever come to their attention. Because a busy audit committee has
less time to hear reports on compliance than does a dedicated
compliance committee, they will be less likely to hear about any
compliance failures. Yet the Delaware courts specifically eschew
making judgments on the efficacy of reporting systems.288 As we

283. Shaev Profit Sharing Account, 2006 WL 391931, at *5.
284. Horman v. Abney, C.A. No. 12290–VCS, 2017 WL 242571, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 19, 2017).
285. Id. at *8.
286. Id.
287. Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 30.
288. See, e.g., Horman, 2017 WL 242571, at *8 (“The Audit committee’s
Charter, also referenced in the Complaint, establishes that the Audit committee’s general responsibility for oversight includes oversight of ‘the Company’s
compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. . . .’ Thus, the Complaint
itself reveals that the Plaintiffs have not plead particularized facts that the
Board ‘utterly’ failed to adopt or implement any reporting and compliance systems.”); In re General Motors Co. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9627-VCG, 2015
WL 3958724, at *2 (Del. Ch. June, 26 2015) (“The Complaint does not allege a
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have seen, the question is characterized as one of existence, rather than quality. Thus Caremark as read through Stone v. Ritter may have a perverse effect on board-level compliance oversight. The creation of a CC, or even lodging a more explicit
compliance function in another committee, creates duties and liability risks that directors would not otherwise have and thus
may discourage board-level compliance activity.
By setting the hurdle for directors so low, the Caremark
standard effectively precludes judicial consideration of compliance issues, whether at board-level or below. One of the historical roles of the Delaware Chancery Court has been to build out
the substance of fiduciary duty in wide-ranging contexts, not just
through liability determinations but through developing ideas of
“best practice” in the course of detailed analysis of particular
cases. 289 The almost-invariable dismissal of cases alleging the
board’s failure of compliance oversight per the Caremark standard has cut off this path for development. This has left a vacuum
in best practice of compliance into which federal prosecutors
have stepped, increasingly requiring firms to upgrade their compliance programs as a condition for a settlement. 290 Unfortu-

total lack of any reporting system at GM; rather, the Plaintiffs allege the reporting system should have transmitted certain pieces of information, namely,
specific safety issues and reports from outside counsel regarding potential punitive damages. In other words, GM had a system for reporting risk to the
Board, but in the Plaintiffs’ view it should have been a better system.”); In re
Lear Corp., 967 A.2d 640, 654 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“The complaint makes clear that
the Lear board held regular meetings and received advice from several relevant
experts. The plaintiffs have therefore not come close to pleading facts suggesting that the Lear directors ‘consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities’ and thereby breached their duty of loyalty.”); Shaev Profit Sharing Account, 2006 WL 391931, at *5 (“The plaintiff conceded at oral argument
that Citigroup had a wide range of compliance systems in place, and that they
had no reason to believe that these systems were not functioning in a basic
sense.”); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003).
289. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004?: A Retrospective on
Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1404 (2005) (“Delaware judges
have had a substantial role in shaping best practices in corporate governance.”).
290. See Barkow, supra note 34 (characterizing DPAs as part of a “new policing” of business crime); Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note
33 (providing data on the use of deferred prosecution agreements to mandate
increases in compliance activity); Kaal & Lacine, supra note 34, at 82–84, 92–
99 (2014) (analyzing data on use of deferred prosecution agreements to mandate
changes in corporate governance).
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nately, this discretionary “regulation by settlement” is seemingly ill-equipped to guide boards how to discharge their responsibilities.291
A more assertive approach to oversight liability would have
at least two beneficial consequences. On the one hand, it would
encourage boards to take compliance oversight more seriously
and trigger more energetic engagement with issues such as committee composition, the possibility of empowered board members, and underlying compliance investment. At the same time,
it would create the opportunity for the Delaware courts to begin
once again to offer meaningful guidance as to governance practices. While judges may be diffident about their expertise on
compliance, their failure to engage has left less-diffident prosecutors to engage in corporate governance oversight.292
The Delaware Supreme Court appears to have signaled a
tougher line on board engagement in compliance in its recent decision in Marchand v. Barnhill,293 decided after earlier versions
of this Article were circulated.294 This was a suit alleging breach
of Caremark duties by the board of Blue Bell, an ice cream manufacturer, which had suffered an outbreak of listeria ultimately
causing the deaths of three people and considerable losses for the
firm.295 Blue Bell had a compliance program that the plaintiff
did not contest was in breach of applicable FDA regulations.296
Rather, the plaintiff’s claim was that the firm did not have in
place a board-level system of compliance oversight, such that red
flags about listeria in the firm’s processing plants were not reported to the board until it was too late.297 For this reason, the
Supreme Court rejected the company’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s suit.298
This decision is encouraging from the perspective of our
analysis because the Court emphasizes that directors’ Caremark

291. Arlen, supra note 33, at 76–81; Copeland, supra note 33, at 10.
292. For a detailed proposal to expand director liability for compliance oversight failures, see Armour et al., supra note 31.
293. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. Ch. 2019).
294. An earlier version of this Article was cited by the Court. Id. at 824
n.115.
295. Id. at 822.
296. Id. at 823.
297. Id. at 811.
298. Id. at 817.

2020]

BOARD COMPLIANCE

1271

obligations are specific and non-delegable: the board needs to attend to the company’s central compliance risk and there must be
a board-level oversight of the compliance mechanism put in
place. “Caremark . . . does require that a board make a good faith
effort to put in a reasonable system of monitoring and reporting
about the corporation’s central compliance risks.”299 “[T]o satisfy
their duty of loyalty, directors must make a good faith effort to
implement an oversight system and then monitor it.” 300 Thus,
Marchand v. Barnhill appears to cabin Stone v. Ritter’s highly
deferential approach to evaluating the sufficiency of board compliance oversight. Caremark read through Marchand now seems
to require board compliance oversight matched to the external
compliance regime.
Of course, a more demanding interpretation of directors’ fiduciary oversight duties by no means implies that companies
should automatically establish a CC. We view it as important to
focus on the board’s separate and independent responsibility to
assure compliance, but the evidence described in this Article
does not support any requirement of a board CC as a matter of
state fiduciary law. Rather, board compliance depends on sound
management compliance, using a variety of mechanisms.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we present empirical findings concerning
how, contrary to the existing literature, far fewer public companies in the U.S. adopt board compliance committees than previously understood. We find that less than 5% of public companies
have board-level compliance committees. What explains this
pattern, largely of non-adoption of board compliance committees?
To make headway, we use our data to explore why boards
(do not) establish compliance committees. We present four main
findings. First, companies that get prosecuted are much more
likely to establish compliance committees. Yet this is not because
prosecutors specifically require them to do so. We review a comprehensive dataset of DPAs and plea bargains entered into by
public companies from 2001 onwards. In only 5 of 374 cases (less
than 2%) do these agreements actually stipulate the creation of

299. Id. at 824.
300. Id. at 821.
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some kind of board compliance committee. Rather, the link appears indirect. Prosecutors do frequently demand enhancements
to a firm’s compliance activities as part of settlements, creating
a sharp increase in need for compliance oversight, which boards
rationally meet by establishing committees.
Second, we find only weak links between factors that might
make a firm’s exposure to potential prosecution seem more
likely—such as being in a heavily regulated sector, or a high rate
of prior prosecution in their industry. This suggests that even
firms for which compliance might be very important are not taking it sufficiently seriously to justify establishment of a dedicated committee. These results suggest that boards take compliance more seriously after their firm has got caught. Does this
imply a troublingly low background level of board compliance?
Our other results give further cause for concern.
Third, we find that outside experience of board compliance
makes a difference. Companies with a board member who also
sits on the board of a firm that already has a CC are much more
likely to establish one themselves. This finding that outside experience matters is consistent with the general literature of diffusion of innovations. Moreover, it suggests that these directors’
experience of board compliance is generally positive, as it increases the likelihood of adoption by other boards on which they
serve. Why, then, are CCs not more widely adopted?
Our fourth result is that boards with compliance committees
tend to be larger and have more independent directors. This,
again, reinforces the idea that compliance oversight is real work
for the board: bigger boards have more capacity. Board capacity
is subject to external constraints: institutional investors, proxy
advisors, and others advocate small boards comprised mainly of
independent persons, who have no employment relationship
with the firm. This may mean boards often lack capacity to do
compliance oversight other than as an audit committee addendum.
These results are at once intriguing and troubling. While
our data do not permit any causal interpretation of the findings,
they are consistent with theoretical claims that compliance is
more often overlooked, rather than overseen, by boards. This has
implications for both corporate law and corporate prosecutions,
which have sought to promote greater board oversight of compliance.
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We concluded by considering ways in which board compliance might be facilitated or encouraged: reconsidering norms
about board size and independence, enhancing accountability of
directors to regulators, and tightening state law fiduciary duties
regarding oversight. Compliance programs seek to prevent some
of the most serious and socially harmful corporate misconduct.
The role of corporate boards in monitoring the compliance program has become increasingly pivotal and deserves more attention from both inside and outside of the boardroom.

